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We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. We
propose a monitored semantics for this calculus, which blocks the execution of processes as soon as
they attempt to leak information. We illustrate the use of this semantics with various examples, and
show that the induced safety property is compositional and that it is strictly included between a
typability property and a security property proposed for an extended calculus in previous work.
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1. Introduction
With the advent of web technologies, we are faced today with a powerful computing environment
which is inherently parallel, distributed and heavily relies on communication. Since computations
take place concurrently on several heterogeneous devices, controlled by parties which possibly
do not trust each other, security properties such as confidentiality and integrity of data become
of crucial importance.
A session is an abstraction for various forms of “structured communication” that may occur
in a parallel and distributed computing environment. Examples of sessions are a client-service
negotiation, a financial transaction, or an interaction among different services within a web ap-
plication. Session types, which specify the expected behaviour of participants in sessions, were
originally introduced in (Honda, 1993; Takeuchi et al., 1994; Honda et al., 1998), on a variant
of the pi-calculus (Milner, 1999) including a construct for session creation and two n-ary opera-
tors of internal and external choice, called selection and branching. The basic properties ensured
by session types are the absence of communication errors (communication safety) and the con-
formance to the session protocol (session fidelity). Since then, more powerful session calculi
have been investigated, allowing multiparty interaction within a session (Honda et al., 2008),
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and equipped with increasingly sophisticated session types, ensuring additional properties like
progress (Bettini et al., 2008; Coppo et al., 2014).
In previous work (Capecchi et al., 2010) and in its expanded version (Capecchi et al., 2013),
we addressed the question of incorporating security requirements into session types. To this end,
we considered a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for both session
participants and data, and we defined a notion of security for this calculus. We then proposed a
session type system for this calculus, adding access control and secure information flow require-
ments in the typing rules, and we showed that this type system guarantees our security property
(preservation of data confidentiality) during session execution.
In this paper, we move one step further by equipping (a slightly simplified version of) the
above calculus with a monitored semantics, which blocks the execution of processes as soon
as they attempt to leak information, raising an error. Typically, this happens when a process
tries to participate in a public communication after receiving a secret value. This monitored
semantics induces a natural notion of safety on processes: a process is safe if all its monitored
computations are successful, in a dynamically evolving environment and in the presence of an
attacker which may add or withdraw messages at each step. Expectedly, this monitored semantics
is closely related to the security type system presented in (Capecchi et al., 2013). Indeed, some
of the constraints imposed by the monitored operational rules are simply lifted from the typing
rules. However, the constraints of the monitoring semantics are simpler than those of the typing
rules, since they refer to individual computations. In other words, they are local whereas type
constraints are both local and global. We also introduce a refinement of the security property
of (Capecchi et al., 2013), which allows the exploration of the behaviour of waiting session
participants “ahead of time”. This look ahead capacity seems needed when the recourse to a static
analysis (like a session type system) to check the conformance of potential session participants
to the session protocol and security policy is either not desired or not possible.
Other advantages of safety over typability are not specific to session calculi. Like security,
safety is a semantic notion. Hence it is more permissive than typability in that it ignores unreach-
able parts of processes. Safety also offers more flexibility than types in dynamic environments
such as that of web programming, where security policies may evolve over time.
Compared to security, safety has again the advantage of locality versus globality: safety is a
property of individual computations, while security is a property of the set of computations of a
process. In session calculi, it also improves on security in another respect. Indeed, in these calculi
processes communicate asynchronously and messages transit in queues before being consumed
by their receivers. Then, while the monitored semantics blocks the very act of putting a public
message in the queue after a secret message has been received, a violation of the security prop-
erty can only be detected after the public message has been put in the queue, that is, after the
confidentiality breach has occurred and possibly already caused damage. This means that safety
allows early detection of leaks, whereas security only allows late leak detection.
Finally, safety seems more appealing than security when the dangerous behaviour comes from
an accidental rather than a malicious transgression of the security policy. Indeed, in this case a
monitored semantics could offer feedback to the programmer, in the form of informative error
messages. Although this possibility is not explored in this paper, it is the object of ongoing work.
The main contribution of this work is a monitored semantics for a multiparty session calculus,
and the proof that:
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1 the induced information flow safety property strictly implies (a refined version of) our previ-
ously defined information flow security property;
2 a simplified version of our previously defined type system, adapted to the present calculus,
strictly implies the induced information flow safety.
A more general contribution of our work is to raise the question of information flow safety in
session calculi. Indeed, while the issue of safety has recently received much attention in the
security community (see Section 10), it has not, to our knowledge, been addressed in the context
of session calculi so far.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we motivate our approach with an
example. Section 3 introduces the syntax and semantics of our calculus. In Section 4 we present
our refined security property and illustrate it with examples. Section 5 presents the monitored
semantics and Section 6 introduces the notion of safety and establishes its compositionality. The
relation between safety and security is examined in Section 7. Section 8 presents our simplified
type system and Section 9 shows that it implies safety. Finally, Section 10 concludes with a
discussion on related and future work.
This work is an extended version of (Capecchi et al., 2011), with complete proofs. It intro-
duces refined versions of the safety and security properties examined in that paper and provides
two additional results: compositionality of (the refined) safety property, and the proof that this
property is assured by a simplified version of the type system of (Capecchi et al., 2013).
2. Motivating example
Let us illustrate our approach with an introductory example, modelling an online medical system.
Consider a ternary protocol involving a user U, a generic medical service S-gen and a specialised
medical service S-spe. The interaction of the user with the generic service is supposed to be less
confidential than her interaction with the specialised service. For simplicity we assume the former
to have level⊥ and the latter to have level⊥ or> according to the privacy of the exchanged data
(here ⊥ means “public” and > means “secret” or “private") †. The user addresses the generic
service first, describing her symptoms and getting back a prescription for a specialised visit.
All this interaction is public, so it takes place at level ⊥. Then the user sends her symptoms to
the specialised service and waits for a diagnosis. The symptoms are again sent publicly, but the
diagnosis needs to be kept confidential, so it should be communicated at level>. Now, according
to whether the diagnosis is critical or not, the user asks either to be admitted to hospital or to
be prescribed some drug treatment. The specialised service answers by sending the name of a
hospital or a drug prescription, according to the user’s request. For the protocol to be secure,
these last interactions should take place at level >, since they depend on the private diagnosis.
More precisely, the whole interaction may be described by the following protocol:
1 a connection is established among U, S-gen and S-spe;
2 U sends her symptoms to S-gen, who sends back a visit prescription;
† In a real-life protocol, the interaction of the user with the generic service would have some level ` higher than ⊥,
but for simplicity we consider only two levels here. Also, a practical medical system should include more than one
specialised service, namely one for each main category of diseases.
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I = a¯[3]
U = a[1](α1). α1!〈2,symptom⊥〉.α1?(2,visit-prescr⊥).
α1!〈3,symptom⊥〉.α1?(3,diagn>). if critical(diagn>)
then α1!〈3,hosp-admiss`〉.α1?(3,hosp-name>).0
else α1!〈3,treatment>〉.α1?(3,drug-prescr>).0
S-gen = a[2](α2). α2?(1,symptom⊥).α2!〈1,visit-prescr⊥〉.0
S-spe = a[3](α3).α3?(1,symptom⊥).α3!〈1,diagn>〉.α3?(1,option>). if hosp(option>)
then α3!〈1,hosp-name>〉.0
else α3!〈1,drug-prescr>〉.0
Fig. 1. The medical service protocol.
3 U sends her symptoms to S-spe, who sends back a diagnosis;
4 U has two possible options according to the seriousness of the diagnosis:
4.1 U asks S-spe for hospital admission and waits for a hospital name from S-spe;
4.2 U requests a treatment to S-spe, who answers with a drug prescription.
In our calculus, this scenario may be described as the parallel composition of the processes
I,U,S-gen and S-spe in Figure 1, where the level ` of hosp-admiss` in U is deliberately left
unspecified, as we wish to discuss two variants of the protocol, a secure one and an insecure one.
A session is an activation of a service, involving a number of participants with predefined
roles. Here processes U, S-gen and S-spe communicate by opening a session on service a. The
initiator a¯[3] specifies the number of participants of a and triggers a session as soon as there is
a participant for each role. Participants are denoted by integers: here U=1, S-gen=2, S-spe=3.
In process U, the prefix a[1](α1) means that U wants to act as participant 1 in service a, using
channel α1 to communicate. The meaning of a[2](α2) in S-gen and a[3](α3) in S-spe is similar.
Security levels appear as superscripts on data and variables‡. When the session is established,
via a synchronisation between the initiator and the prefixes a[i](αi), U sends a public message
to S-gen (prefix α1!〈2,symptom⊥〉) and waits for a public answer (prefix α1?(2,visit-prescr⊥)).
Then U sends the same message to S-spe and waits for a secret answer (prefix α1?(3,diagn>)).
Depending on whether the diagnosis is critical or not, U issues two different requests to S-spe:
either a request of level ` for hospital admission (prefix α1!〈3,hosp-admiss`〉), or a secret request
for a drug treatment (prefix α1!〈3, treatment>〉). We let the reader figure out the rest of the
interaction between U and S-spe, to focus now on the issue of safety and security.
Corresponding to the two possibilities for the level ` in α1!〈3,hosp-admiss`〉, we obtain two
different versions of the protocol, one of which is safe and secure, while the other is neither safe
nor secure. In case ` = >, the protocol is secure since a public observer will see no difference
between the two branches of the conditional (in both cases he will observe the empty behaviour).
It is also safe since no computation exhibits a “level drop” from an input or test of level > to
a following action of level ⊥. Indeed, the monitored semantics records the level of inputs and
tests, and checks them again subsequent actions to prevent level drops. Instead, if ` = ⊥, the
‡ Levels on operators, which are needed to track indirect flows (as explained in Section 5), are omitted in this example.
4
first branch of the conditional has a level drop, and the monitored semantics will block before
executing the request that would violate safety. This version of the protocol is also insecure, since
two different behaviours can be observed by a public observer after testing the secret diagnosis:
in one case the emission of hosp-admiss⊥, in the other case the empty behaviour.
To sum up, for ` = > the protocol is safe and secure, while for ` = ⊥ it is both unsafe and
insecure. This is what we expect, since by asking publicly for hospital admission, U accidentally
reveals some information about her diagnosis, namely that it is critical.
Let us note that the insecure version of the protocol is also rejected by the type system
of (Capecchi et al., 2013), which statically ensures the correction of all possible executions.
Moreover, this example illustrates the fact that safety ensures early leak detection, while security
only allows late leak detection. Indeed, the bisimulation used to check security will fail only once
hosp-admiss⊥ has been put in the queue, and thus possibly exploited by an attacker. By contrast,
the monitored semantics will block the very act of putting hosp-admiss⊥ in the queue.
For the sake of conciseness, we deliberately simplified the scenario in the above example. A
more realistic example would involve persistent services and allow several users to interact with
them. Our simple example is mainly meant to highlight the novel issue of monitored execution.
3. Syntax and Standard Semantics
Our calculus is a variant of that studied in (Capecchi et al., 2013): it focuses on the constructs
which are meaningful for safety. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider here access control
and declassification, although their addition would not pose any problem. We also restrict the
range of values that processes may exchange, omitting the send/receive of service and channel
names, because our monitored semantics treats them in the same way as other values. Since
service names cannot be exchanged, we do not consider the possibility of restricting them via
name hiding.
Let (S ,≤) be a finite lattice of security levels, ranged over by `,`′. We denote by unionsq and u the
join and meet operations on the lattice, and by ⊥ and > its minimal and maximal elements. We
assume the following sets: values (booleans, integers), ranged over by v,v′ . . ., value variables,
ranged over by x,y . . ., service names, ranged over by a,b, . . . , each of which has an arity n ≥ 2
(its number of participants) and a security level ` (Example 5.2 justifies the necessity of this
level), channel variables, ranged over by α,β , . . . , and labels, ranged over by λ ,λ ′, . . . (acting
like labels in labelled records). Sessions, the central abstraction of our calculus, are denoted with
s,s′ . . .. A session represents a particular instance or activation of a service. Hence sessions only
appear at runtime. We use p, q,. . . to denote the participants of a session. In an n-ary session (a
session corresponding to an n-ary service) p, q are assumed to range over the natural numbers
1, . . . ,n. We denote by Π a non empty set of participants. Each session s has an associated set
of channels with role s[p], one for each participant. Channel s[p] is the private channel through
which participant p communicates with the other participants in the session s. A new session s on
an n-ary service a` is opened when the initiator a¯`[n] of the service synchronises with n processes
of the form a`[1](α1).P1, . . . ,a`[n](αn).Pn, whose channels αp then get replaced by s[p] in the
body of Pp. The use of an initiator to start a new session was first proposed in our previous work
(Capecchi et al. 2010). The idea is that, while binary sessions may be viewed as an interaction
between a client and a server, which is naturally started by the client, in a multiparty session there
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c ::= α | s[p] Channel
v ::= true | false | . . . Value
e ::= x` | v` | not e
| e and e′ | . . . Expression
D ::= X(x,α) = P Declaration
Π ::= {p} | Π∪{p} Set of participants
ϑ ::= v` | λ ` Message content
m ::= (p,Π,ϑ) Message
h ::= m ·h | ε Queue
H ::= H ∪{s : h} | /0 Q-set
P ::= a¯`[n] Session init.
| a`[p](α).P p-th session part.
| c!〈Π,e〉.P Output
| c?(p,x`).P Input
| c⊕` 〈Π,λ 〉.P Selection
| c&`(p,{λi : Pi}i∈I) Branching
| if e then P else Q Conditional
| P | Q Parallel
| 0 Inaction
| def D in P Recursion
| X〈e,c〉 Process call
C ::= < P , H > Basic config.
| C‖C Config. parallel
| (νs)C Session name hiding
Table 1. Syntax of processes, expressions and queues.
is no such natural choice of a starting participant. The participants are on an equal footing, and it
seems preferable to add a separate initiator than to arbitrarily select one of the peer participants as
the starting one (as it is done in other work on multiparty sessions). Moreover, although this is not
exploited here, the presence of the initiator somehow indicates the availability of the service, and
in more complex calculi one could envisage more refined forms for the initiator (for instance, in
case of unavailability of the service, the initiator could act as a forwarder to a substitute service).
We use c to range over channel variables and channels with roles. Finally, we assume a set of
process variables X ,Y, . . . , in order to define recursive behaviours.
As in (Honda et al., 2008), in order to model TCP-like asynchronous communications (with
non-blocking send but message order preservation between a given pair of participants), we use
queues of messages, denoted by h; an element of h may be a value message (p,Π,v`), indicating
that the value v is sent by participant p to all participants in Π, or a label message (p,Π,λ `),
indicating that p selects the process with label λ among those offered by the set of participants
Π. The empty queue is denoted by ε , and the concatenation of a message m to a queue h by h ·m.
Conversely, m · h means that m is the head of the queue. Since there may be interleaved, nested
and parallel sessions, we distinguish their queues with names. We denote by s : h the named
queue h associated with session s. We use H,K to range over sets of named queues with different
session names, also called Q-sets.
Table 1 summarises the syntax of expressions, ranged over by e,e′, . . . , and of processes,
ranged over by P,Q . . . , as well as the runtime syntax of the calculus (session names, chan-
nels with role, messages, queues). A user process is a process generated without using runtime
syntax.
Let us briefly comment on the primitives of the language. We already described session ini-
tiation. Communications within a session are performed on channels with role using the next
two pairs of primitives: the send and receive of a value and the selection and branching opera-
tors (where one participant chooses one of the branches offered by another participant). Choice
primitives are decorated with security levels, whose use will be justified in Example 5.3. The
variables in the process declarations do not have levels since they are not necessary, contrary to
what happens for the variables in inputs (see Example 4.11). When there is no risk of confusion
we will omit the set delimiters {,}, particularly around singletons.
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P | 0≡ P P | Q≡ Q | P (P | Q) | R≡ P | (Q | R) def D in 0≡ 0
(def D in P) | Q≡ def D in (P | Q) def D in (def D′ in P)≡ def D′ in (def D in P)
h · (p,Π,ϑ) · (p′,Π′,ϑ ′) ·h′ ≡ h · (p′,Π′,ϑ ′) · (p,Π,ϑ) ·h′ if Π∩Π′ = /0 or p 6= p′
h · (p,Π,ϑ) ·h′ ≡ h · (p,Π′,ϑ) · (p,Π′′,ϑ) ·h′ if Π=Π′∪Π′′ and Π′∩Π′′ = /0
H ≡ H ′ and h≡ h′ ⇒ H ∪{s : h} ≡ H ′∪{s : h′}
P≡ Q and H ≡ K ⇒ < P , H >≡< Q , K >
C ≡ C′ ⇒ (νs)C ≡ (νs)C′ (νss′)C ≡ (νs′s)C
(ν s˜)< P , H > ‖(ν s˜′)< Q , K > ≡ (ν s˜s˜′)< P | Q , H ∪K > if qn(H)∩qn(K) = /0
Table 2. Structural equivalence.
a`[1](α1).P1 | ... | a`[n](αn).Pn | a¯`[n] −→ (νs)< P1{s[1]/α1} | ... | Pn{s[n]/αn} , s : ε >
[Link]
< s[p]!〈Π,e〉.P , s : h >−→< P , s : h · (p,Π,v`)> where e↓v` [Send]
< s[q]?(p,x`).P , s : (p,q,v`) ·h > −→< P{v/x} , s : h > [Rec]
< s[p]⊕` 〈Π,λ 〉.P , s : h >−→< P , s : h · (p,Π,λ `)> [Label]
< s[q]&`(p,{λi : Pi}i∈I) , s : (p,q,λ `i0) ·h >−→< Pi0 , s : h > where i0 ∈ I [Branch]
if e then P else Q−→ P where e ↓ true` if e then P else Q−→ Q where e ↓ false`
[If-T, If-F]
def X(x,α) = P in (X〈e,s[p]〉 | Q) −→ def X(x,α) = P in (P{v`/x}{s[p]/α} | Q) where e ↓ v` [Def]
< P , H >−→ (ν s˜)< P′ , H ′ > ⇒ < E [P] , H >−→ (ν s˜)< E [P′] , H ′ > [Cont]
C −→ (ν s˜)C′ ⇒ (ν s˜′)(C‖C′′)−→ (ν s˜′)(ν s˜)(C′ ‖C′′) [Scop]
C ≡ C′ and C′ −→C′′ and C′′ ≡ C′′′ ⇒ C −→C′′′ [Struct]
Table 3. Standard reduction rules.
The operational semantics is defined on configurations< P , H >, which are pairs of a process
P and a Q-set H. Indeed, in our calculus queues need to be isolated from processes (unlike in
other session calculi, where queues are handled by running them in parallel with processes),
since they will constitute the observable part of processes in our security and safety notions.
Formally, a configuration is a pair C =< P , H >, possibly restricted with respect to session
names, or a parallel composition (C‖C′) of two configurations whose Q-sets have disjoint ses-
sion names. In a configuration (νs)< P , H >, all occurrences of s[p] in P and H are bound, as
well as those of s in H. By abuse of notation we often write P instead of < P , /0 >.
As usual, the reduction relation is defined modulo a structural equivalence ≡. The rules for ≡
are given in Table 2. We use qn(H) for the queue names of H. Assuming Barendregt convention,
no bound name can occur free or in two different bindings. The structural rules for processes
are standard (Milner, 1999). Among the rules for queues, we have one for commuting indepen-
dent messages and another one for splitting a message for multiple recipients. The structural
equivalence of configurations allows the parallel composition ‖ to be eliminated so that, modulo
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≡, each configuration has the form (ν s˜) < P , H >, where (ν s˜)C stands for (νs1) · · ·(νsk)C if
s˜ = s1 · · ·sk and for C if s˜ is empty.
The transitions for configurations have the form (ν s˜) < P , H >−→ (ν s˜′) < P′ , H ′ >. They
are derived using the reduction rules in Table 3. Let us comment on the most interesting rules.
Rule [Link] describes the initiation of a new session among n processes, corresponding to an
activation of the service a of arity n and security level `. After the connection, the participants
share a private session name s and the corresponding queue, initialised to s : ε . In each participant
Pp, the channel variable αp is replaced by the channel with role s[p]. Session initiation is the only
synchronous interaction of the calculus. All the other communications, which take place within
an established session, are performed asynchronously in two steps, via push and pop operations
on the queue associated with the session.
The output rules [Send] and [Label] push values and labels, respectively, into the queue s : h. In
rule [Send], e ↓ v` denotes the evaluation of the expression e to the value v`, where ` is the join of
the security levels of the variables and values occurring in e. The input rules [Rec] and [Branch]
perform the complementary operations. Rules [If-T], [If-F], [Def] and [Cont] are standard.
The evaluation contexts E used in Rule [Cont] are defined by:
E ::= [ ] | def D in E | E | P | P | E
The contextual rule [Scop] for configurations is also standard. In this rule, Barendregt convention
ensures that the names in s˜ are disjoint from those in s˜′ and do not appear in C′′. As usual, we use
−→∗ for the reflexive and transitive closure of −→.
4. Security
We introduce now our property of information flow security for processes (referred to simply as
security in the sequel), which is a refined version of that proposed in (Capecchi et al., 2011) for
an extension of the present calculus, discussed at the beginning of Section 3. As will be argued
later in some depth, this refinement is interesting in that it leads to a more discriminating security
property, which is closer to that of typability. Notably our main result on security, which states
that safety implies security (Theorem 7.8), also holds for the original definition of security.
Our security property is essentially noninterference, adapted to our session calculus. We intro-
duce it by an informal discussion, which is largely recalled from (Capecchi et al., 2013).
We are looking for a security property which is persistent in the sense of (Bossi et al., 2004),
namely which holds in any reachable state of a process, assuming the process may be restarted
with fresh Q-sets in any state. This means that we view processes as evolving in a dynamic and
potentially hostile environment, where at each step an attacker/observer may inject new messages
or consume existing messages, in order to discover the secret data used by the processes.
In our calculus, an insecure information flow – or information leak – occurs when an action of
level `′ depends on the occurrence or the value of an input action of level ` 6≤ `′.
A typical information leak occurs when a low action is guarded by a high input, as in the
following process P, where s is some previously opened session with two participants:
(∗) P = s[1]?(2,x>).s[1]!〈2,e〉.0 where e↓v⊥
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In process P, the first participant of session s waits for a message from the second participant,
and then she replies by sending to the second participant the value of a low expression e.
This process is insecure because the occurrence of the high input depends on whether or not
a matching message is offered by the high environment, which is something we do not control.
Since input is a blocking operator, the low output will be able to occur in the first case but not in
the latter, and the observer will conclude that the low output depends on the high input. Note that
in process P the value v⊥ of the expression e cannot depend on the value received for x>, since
in this case e should contain x> and therefore its value could not have level ⊥§. Hence the leak
in P is only due to the presence or absence of a >-message in the environment, not on its value.
Another typical leak occurs when a high input guards a high conditional which tests the re-
ceived value in order to choose between two different low behaviours in its branches. Consider
the following process:
(∗∗) Q = s[1]!〈2, true>〉.0 | s[2]?(1,x>).if x> then s[2]!〈3, true⊥〉.0 else s[2]!〈3, false⊥〉.0
Here session s has three participants. The second participant may input the message sent by
the first participant, and depending on its value (which can be changed by an attacker between
the asynchronous emission and reception) she will send two different low values to the third
participant. This process is insecure because the value of the low message sent by participant 2 to
participant 3 depends on the value of the high message received by participant 2 from participant
1. Here the leak is caused by the value of a high message rather than by its presence or absence.
As a matter of fact, the Example (∗∗) above is not completely correct, since in our persis-
tent notion of security we assume that the attacker can add or withdraw high messages at each
step. Hence, after participant 1 has sent her message to participant 2, this message could again
disappear from the queue, and participant 2 would be blocked, just as participant 1 in Example
(∗). However, Example (∗∗) can be easily fixed by rendering both components of process Q
recursive, so that the high message for participant 2 is continuously offered by participant 1.
This is the reason why most examples in this section will be composed of recursive processes.
We will also make sure that all our examples are well-behaved with respect to session protocols,
in the sense that they are typable by means of classical session types (this means for instance
that if a participant is recursive, then the matching participants must be recursive too). Indeed,
interestingly enough, session type systems already rule out a number of insecure processes. This
is why we shall focus on the insecurities that can appear in session-typable processes.
As in (Capecchi et al., 2013), we assume that the observer can see the messages in session
queues. As usual for security, observation is relative to a given downward-closed set of levels
L ⊆S , the intuition being that an observer who can see messages of level ` can also see all
messages of level `′ lower than `. In the following, we shall always useL to denote a downward-
closed subset of levels. For any suchL , anL -observer will only be able to see messages whose
levels belong toL , what we may callL -messages. Hence two queues that agree onL -messages
will be indistinguishable for an L -observer. Let now L -messages be the complementary mes-
sages, those theL -observer cannot see. Then, anL -observer may also be viewed as an attacker
who tries to reconstruct the dependency betweenL -messages andL -messages (and hence, ulti-
§ Recall that the level of an expression is the join of the levels of the variables and values occurring in it.
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mately, to discover theL -messages), by injecting or withdrawingL -messages at each step and
observing the effect thus produced onL -messages.
To formalise this intuition, a notion of L -equality =L on Q-sets is introduced, representing
indistinguishability of Q-sets by an L -observer. Using =L , we then define a notion of L -
bisimulation 'L representing indistinguishability of processes by an L -observer. Formally, a
queue s : h is L -observable if it contains some message with level in L . Note that this means
that empty queues are never observable, even when they are associated with a service of level
in L . Then two Q-sets are L -equal if their L -observable queues have the same names and
contain the same messages with level inL . This equality is based on anL -projection operation
on Q-sets, which discards all messages whose level is not inL .
Let the function lev be given by: lev(v`) = lev(λ `) = `.
Definition 4.1 (L -Projection). The projection operation ⇓ L is defined inductively on mes-
sages, queues and Q-sets as follows:
(p,Π,ϑ) ⇓L =
{
(p,Π,ϑ) if lev(ϑ) ∈L ,
ε otherwise
ε ⇓L = ε
(m ·h) ⇓L = m ⇓L ·h ⇓L
/0 ⇓L = /0 (H ∪{s : h}) ⇓L =
{
H ⇓L ∪{s : h ⇓L } if h ⇓L 6= ε,
H ⇓L otherwise
Definition 4.2 (L -Equality of Q-sets). Two Q-sets H and K areL -equal, written H =L K, if
H ⇓L = K ⇓L .
Let us move now to the notionL -bisimulation. The idea is to test processes by running them
in conjunction with L -equal queues. However, as argued in (Capecchi et al., 2013), we can-
not allow arbitrary combinations of processes with queues, since this would lead us to reject
intuitively secure processes as simple as s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 and s[2]?(1,x⊥).0, as explained next.
For example, the process P= s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 does not react in the same way when combined
with the two Q-sets H1 = {s : ε} =⊥ /0 = H2. Indeed, while P reduces when combined with
{s : ε}, it is stuck when combined with /0. Formally:
< P , {s : ε}>−→< 0 , {s : (1,2, true⊥)}> < P , /0 > 6−→
Therefore an L -observer with L = {⊥} would detect an insecurity by looking at the resulting
Q-sets H ′1 = {s : (1,2, true⊥)} 6=⊥ /0 = H ′2.
To get around this problem, a natural requirement is that the Q-sets always contain enough
queues to enable all outputs of the process to reduce. For this it suffices that in a configuration
< P , H >, every session name which occurs free in P has a corresponding queue in H. We use
sn(P) (resp. fsn(P)) to denote the set of session names (resp. free session names) in P.
Definition 4.3. A configuration 〈P,H〉 is saturated if all session names in P are unrestricted and
have corresponding queues in H, i.e. s ∈ sn(P) implies s ∈ fsn(P) and s ∈ qn(H).
Since the only rule that creates a new session is [Link], which simultaneously creates the corre-
sponding queue, it is easy to check that starting from a closed user process and the empty Q-set,
we always obtain configurations (ν s˜)〈P,H〉 such that 〈P,H〉 is saturated.
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A dual phenomenon occurs with inputs. Consider the process Q with Q-sets H1 =⊥ H2:
Q = s[2]?(1,x⊥).0 H1 = {s : (1,2, true⊥)} H2 = {s : (1,2, true>) · (1,2, true⊥)}
Note that<Q , H1 >−→< 0 , {s : ε}>, while<Q , H2 > 6−→, and {s : ε} 6=⊥ H2. What happens
here is that the top level message in H2 is transparent for the ⊥-equality, but it prevents the
process from reading the subsequent bottom level message. Note that the problem comes from
the fact that both messages have the same receiver and the same sender, since if we took H3 =
{s : (3,2, true>) · (1,2, true⊥)}, then we would have < Q , H3 >−→< 0 , {s : (3,2, true>)} >,
thanks to the structural equivalence on queues given in Table 2.
We may get around this problem by imposing one simple condition on Q-sets (monotonicity).
Monotonicity states that in every queue of a Q-set, the security levels of messages with the same
sender and common receivers can only stay equal or increase along a sequence.
Definition 4.4 (Monotonicity). A queue is monotone if lev(ϑ1) ≤ lev(ϑ2) whenever the mes-
sage (p,Π1,ϑ1) precedes the message (p,Π2,ϑ2) in the queue and Π1 ∩Π2 6= /0. A Q-set H is
monotone if every queue in H is monotone.
Note that saturation and monotonicity are constraints on the Q-sets, which the observer must
respect when experimenting on a process. Intuitively, they require that the Q-sets chosen by the
observer are “compatible” with the process, in the sense that they do not artificially block its
execution. In other words, the observer is only allowed to detect existing insecurities, not to
introduce new insecurities in the process.
To define our bisimulation, we need one further ingredient ¶. Note that, while the asynchronous
communications among participants can be observed by looking at the changes they induce on
the Q-sets, there is no means to observe the behaviour of a potential session participant, as long
as it is not triggered by the initiator together with a complete set of matching participants. This
means that an “incomplete process” like P = a⊥[1](α).α!〈2, true⊥〉.0 would be equivalent to
0. However, it is clear that it behaves differently when plugged into a complying context. For
instance, if we put P in parallel with the initiator and the missing partner we get:
< P | a⊥[2](β ).β?(1,x⊥).0 | a¯⊥[2] , /0 >−→∗ (νs)(< s[2]?(1,x⊥).0 , {s : (1,2,true⊥)}>)
while if we put 0 in the same context we get < 0 | a⊥[2](β ).β?(1,x⊥).0 | a¯⊥[2] , /0 > 6−→.
Since session initiation is a synchronous interaction, which is blocking for all session partic-
ipants, it would not be possible to use the Q-sets to keep track of it. We therefore introduce a
notion of tester, a sort of behaviourless process which triggers session participants in order to re-
veal their potential behaviour. Our testers bear a strong analogy with the notion of test introduced
by De Nicola and Hennessy in the 80’s (De Nicola and Hennessy, 1983), although they are much
simpler in our case, since they are only used to explore potential participant behaviours and not
to test active processes. Moreover, they are not aimed at establishing a testing equivalence, but
merely at rendering the bisimulation more contextual.
Formally, a tester is a parallel composition of session initiators and degenerate session partic-
ipants, which cannot reduce by itself.
¶ Strictly speaking, this ingredient is not essential to define the bisimulation, but it leads to a more discriminating
security notion than that of (Capecchi et al., 2011), closer to that of typability in the type system of Section 8.
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Definition 4.5. The syntax of pre-testers is
Z ::= a¯`[n] | a`[p](α).0 | Z | Z
A tester is an irreducible pre-tester.
(a`[p1](αp1).Pp1 | ... | a`[pk](αpk ).Ppk | a¯`[n] )  (a`[pk+1](αpk+1).0 | ... | a`[pn](αpn).0);
(νs)< Pp1{s[p1]/αp1} | ... | Ppk{s[pk]/αpk} , s : ε > where k < n
[ExtLink1]
(a`[p1](αp1).Pp1 | ... | a`[pk](αpk ).Ppk )  (a`[pk+1](αpk+1).0 | ... | a`[pn](αpn).0 | a¯`[n] ) ;
(νs)< Pp1{s[p1]/αp1} | ... | Ppk{s[pk]/αpk} , s : ε >
[ExtLink2]
< P  Z , H >; (ν s˜)< P′ , H ′ > ⇒ < E [P]  Z , H >; (ν s˜)< E [P′] , H ′ > [ContTest]
< P , H >−→ (ν s˜)< P′ , H ′ > ⇒ < P  Z , H >; (ν s˜)< P′ , H ′ > [DropTest]
Table 4. Reduction rules for testers.
To run processes together with testers, we introduce an asymmetric (non commutative) triggering
operator P  Z, whose behaviour is given by the transition relation ; defined by the rules in
Table 4. The two “external link” rules [ExtLink1] and [ExtLink2] only differ for the presence
or not of the initiator inside the process. Note the condition k < n in rule [ExtLink1], which is
needed since 0 is not a tester (as we will discuss further below). Rule [ContTest] is a standard
context rule. Rule [DropTest] allows the process to move alone in case the tester is not needed.
Let us stress that in all cases the tester Z disappears after the reduction. This is because testers
are not interesting in themselves, but only insofar as they may reveal the ability of processes to
contribute to a session initiation. A term P  Z is read “P triggered by Z”.
We are now ready for defining our bisimulation. A relationR on processes is aL -bisimulation
if, whenever two related processes are put in parallel with the same tester and then coupled
with L -equal monotone Q-sets yielding saturated configurations, then the reduction relation
preserves both the relationR on processes and theL -equality of Q-sets:
Definition 4.6 (L -Bisimulation on processes). A symmetric relationR ⊆ (Pr×Pr) is aL -
bisimulation if P1RP2 implies, for any tester Z and any pair of monotone Q-sets H1 and H2 such
that H1 =L H2 and each < Pi , Hi > is saturated:
If < P1 Z , H1 >; (ν s˜)< P′1 , H ′1 >, then either H ′1 =L H2 and P′1R P2, or there exist
P′2,H
′
2 such that < P2 Z , H2 >; · −→∗ (ν s˜)< P′2 , H ′2 > , where H ′1 =L H ′2 and P′1R P′2.
Processes P1,P2 areL -bisimilar, P1 'L P2, if P1R P2 for someL -bisimulationR.
Note that s˜ is either the empty string or a fresh session name s (when the applied rule opens a
new session, in which case by Barendregt convention the name s cannot occur in P2 and H2).
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Intuitively, a transition that adds or removes a L -message must be simulated in one or more
steps, yielding aL -equal Q-set, whereas a transition that does not affectL -messages (but pos-
sibly opens a new session, using or not the tester) may be simulated by inaction.
Let us illustrate the use of testers with some examples. Note that although “complete pro-
cesses” may reduce autonomously without the help of any tester, we do not allow the inaction
process as a tester. Indeed, its use may be simulated by any tester whose names are disjoint from
those of the tested process, what we call a fresh tester. In fact, the quantification over Z in Defi-
nition 4.6 may be restricted in practice to those testers that make the process react, by triggering
some of its waiting participants, together with one fresh tester that forces the process to progress
by itself, if possible, and get stuck otherwise.
We will use < P , H > −→ < P′ , H ′ > as a shorthand for < P  Z , H >; < P′ , H ′ >,
when the reduction of P  Z does not use the rules [ExtLink1] and [ExtLink2] in Table 4.
Example 4.7. Consider the three processes:
P1 = 0
P2 = a⊥[1](α).α!〈2, true⊥〉.0
P3 = a¯⊥[2] | a⊥[1](α).α!〈2, true⊥〉.0 | a⊥[2](β ).β?(1,x⊥).0
It is easy to see that no pair of Pi is in the⊥-bisimilarity relation. Assume in all cases the starting
Q-sets to be /0. To distinguish P2 from P3, which is a complete process that can progress by itself,
we may use the fresh tester b¯⊥[2]. Then this tester will just be dropped when put in parallel with
P3, and P3 will move by itself to a state P′3, opening a new session s and generating the Q-set
{s : ε}. Since P2 cannot move alone and the tester b¯⊥[2] cannot make it react, P2 will respond by
staying put, thus keeping unchanged the Q-set /0=⊥ {s : ε}. But now, if P2 and P′3 are tested again
with b¯⊥[2] and coupled with the Q-set {s : ε}, then P′3 will produce the Q-set {s : (1,2, true⊥)},
while P2 will remain stuck on the Q-set {s : ε} 6=⊥ {s : (1,2, true⊥)}.
To distinguish P1 from P2, we may use the tester a¯⊥[2] | a⊥[2](β ).0, which produces no effect
on P1 but activates P2, allowing it to move to a state P′2, from which a low output is possible. To
distinguish P1 from P3 we use the same fresh tester b¯⊥[2] and a similar reasoning.
Testers may also be used to explore some deadlocked processes, when the deadlock is caused
by inverted “calls” to two different services in dual components, as shown by the next example.
However, as expected, the bisimulation will not equate such a deadlocked process with a correct
process where the two calls occur in the same order in the two components.
Example 4.8. Consider the following processes, where s is some previously opened session:
P1 = a⊥[1](α1).b⊥[1](β1).s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 | b⊥[2](β2).a⊥[2](α2).0 | a¯⊥[2] | b¯⊥[2]
P2 = a⊥[1](α1).b⊥[1](β1).s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 | a⊥[2](α2).b⊥[2](β2).0 | a¯⊥[2] | b¯⊥[2]
It is easy to see that processes P1 and P2 are not ⊥-bisimilar. Indeed, P1 is deadlocked since the
service calls to a and b occur in reverse order in its two components. Instead, the calls occur in
the same order in the components of P2. Hence P2 may progress by itself and thus it is sufficient
to test it with a fresh tester, as in Example 4.7, to distinguish it from the blocked process P1.
Note that while being deadlocked P1 is not equated with 0, since the latter is inert while P1
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can be explored with testers that allow the sessions on services a⊥ and b⊥ to be opened and the
following low output to be uncovered.
The notions ofL -security and security are now defined in the standard way:
Definition 4.9 (Security).
1 A process isL -secure if it isL -bisimilar with itself.
2 A process is secure if it isL -secure for everyL .
Let us illustrate our security property with some examples. The simplest insecure process in
our calculus is an input of level ` followed by an action of level `′ 6≥ `:
Example 4.10. (Insecurity of high input followed by low action)
Consider the process P and the Q-sets H1 and H2, where H1 =⊥ H2:
P = s[1]?(2,x>).s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0, H1 = {s : (2,1, true>)}, H2 = {s : ε}
Here we have < P , H1 >−→< s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 , {s : ε}>=< P1 , H ′1 >, while < P , H2 > 6−→.
Since H ′1 = {s : ε} = H2, we can proceed with P1 = s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 and P2 = P. Take now
K1 = K2 = {s : ε}. Then < P1 , K1 >−→< 0 , {s : (1,2, true⊥)}>, while < P2 , K2 > 6−→. Since
{s : (1,2, true⊥)} 6=⊥ {s : ε}= K2, P is not ⊥-secure.
With a similar argument we may show that Q = s[1]?(2,x>).s[1]?(2,y⊥).0 is not ⊥-secure.
We may now justify the use of security levels on value variables.
Example 4.11. (Need for levels on value variables)
Suppose we had no levels on value variables. Then any variable could be replaced by values
of any level. In this case, any process that performs an input and then outputs a value of level
` 6=> would turn out to be insecure. For instance, consider the process P̂, which differs from P
in Example 4.10 only because it has no level on the variable x, together with the Q-sets H1, H2:
P̂ = s[1]?(2,x).s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0, H1 = {s : (2,1, true>)}, H2 = {s : ε}
Then P̂ would be insecure when run with H1 and H2, for the same reason why P was insecure in
Example 4.10. This means that we would have no way to describe a secure process that receives
a value of level ⊥ and then outputs a value of level ` 6=>, for instance.
By annotating the variable x with the level ⊥, we make sure that P̂ cannot reduce with H1
either, and thus the insecurity disappears.
Interestingly, an insecure component may be “sanitised” by its context, so that the insecurity
is not detectable in the overall process. Clearly, in case of a deadlocking context, the insecurity
is masked simply because the dangerous part cannot be executed. However, the curing context
could also be a partner of the insecure component, as shown by the next example. This example
is significant because it constitutes a non trivial case of a process that is secure but not safe, as
will be further discussed in Section 7.
Example 4.12. (Insecurity sanitised by recursion and parallel context)
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Consider the recursive version R of process P in Example 4.10, in parallel with a dual process R:
R = def X(x,α) = Q in X〈true⊥,s[1]〉
R = def Y (z,β ) = Q in Y 〈true>,s[2]〉
where Q = α?(2,y>1 ).α!〈2,x〉.X(x,α) and Q = β !〈1,z〉.β?(1,y⊥2 ).Y (z,β ).
We show that R | R is secure (while R is not). Take again H1 = {s : (1,2, true>)}=⊥ {s : ε}=
H2. Then the moves
< R | R , H1 >−→∗< R′ | R , {s : ε}>
where R′ = def X(x,α) = Q in s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.X〈true⊥,s[1]〉, can be simulated by:
< R | R , H2 >−→∗< R | R′ , {s : (2,1, true>)}>−→∗ < R′ | R′ , {s : ε}>
where R′ = def Y (z,β ) = Q in s[2]?(1,y⊥2 ).Y 〈true>,s[2]〉. Let us now compare R1 = R′ | R and
R2 = R′ | R′. Let K1,K2 be monotone Q-sets such that K1 =⊥ K2, and both containing a queue
s : h. Now, if<R1 , K1 >moves first, either it does the high output of R, in which case<R2 , K2 >
replies by staying idle, since the resulting processes will be equal and the resulting queues K′1,K
′
2
will be such that K′1 =⊥ K
′
2, or it executes its first component, in which case < R2 , K2 > does
exactly the same, clearly preserving the⊥-equality of Q-sets, and it remains to prove that R | R is
⊥-bisimilar to R | R′. But this is easy to see since if the first process moves its right component,
then the second process may stay idle, while if the second process moves its right component,
then the first process may simulate the move in two steps.
Conversely, if < R2 , K2 > moves first, then either it executes its right component (if the queue
allows it), in which case < R1 , K1 > simulates the move in two steps, or it executes its left
component, in which case < R1 , K1 > simulates it by moving its left component in the same
way, and then we are reduced once again to prove that R | R is ⊥-bisimilar to R | R′.
We conclude this section by showing that, notwithstanding the use of testers to mimic the pres-
ence of session participants in the environment, our security property fails to be compositional.
Let us start with an example that suggests how testers could help ensuring compositionality.
Example 4.13. Without testers, the following process:
s[1]?(2,x>).a>[1](α).s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0
would be secure, because it can only read a top message on a queue. However, when composed
in parallel with the process a¯>[2] | a>[2](β ).0, it gives rise to an insecure process, as discussed
in Example 4.10.
Example 4.14. Consider the following process:
P = P1 | P2 | b`[1](β1).β1!〈2, true⊥〉.0 | b`[2](β2).β2?(1,y⊥).0 | b¯`[3]
P1 = def X(x,α) = α!〈2,x〉.X(x,α) in X〈true>,s[1]〉
P2 = def Y (y,β ) = β?(1,z>).if z> then b`[3](β3).Y (y,β ) else a`[1](α1).Y (y,β )
in Y 〈false>,s[2]〉
This process is insecure. Since the input of P2 is continuously enabled (because P1 continuously
emits a matching message), the insecurity stems from the fact that, according to the value re-
ceived by P2 for z>, the residual process with a fresh tester will either start a new session on
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service b`, where a ⊥-value is exchanged, or get stuck. However, note that all components are
secure, both with `=⊥ and with `=>. Indeed, testers are of no help for compositionality here.
We could try to get around this example by adding levels to queues, thus considering queues
of the form s` : h, and adapting our notion of projection for Q-sets so as to observe low empty
queues. This will render insecure the first component with `=⊥, but not with `=>. For `=>,
all components would still be secure, while the global process is insecure. Hence, levels on
queues would not be sufficient by themselves to ensure security compositionality. We could try to
go one step further by blocking the execution of components of the form b`[1](β1).β1!〈2, true`′〉.0
whenever ` 6≤ `′, producing a failure signal to stop the bisimulation game, but this would not be
satisfactory as it would go against the extensional character of the security property.
5. Monitored Semantics
In this section we introduce the monitored semantics for our calculus. This semantics is defined
on monitored processes M,M′, whose syntax is the following, assuming µ ∈S :
M ::= Peµ | M |M | | def D in M
In a monitored process Peµ , the level µ that tags P is called the monitoring level for P. It controls
the execution of P by blocking any communication of level ` 6≥ µ . Intuitively, Peµ represents a
partially executed process, and µ is the join of the levels of received objects (values or labels) up
to this point in execution.
The monitored semantics is defined on monitored configurations C =<M , H >. By abuse of
notation, we use the same symbol C for standard and monitored configurations.
The semantic rules define simultaneously a reduction relation C(→ C′ and an error predicate
C † on monitored configurations. As usual, the semantic rules are applied modulo a structural
equivalence ≡ (see Table 5). The new specific structural rules for monitored processes are:
(P | Q)eµ ≡ Peµ | Qeµ (def D in P)eµ ≡ def D in Peµ
The reduction rules of the monitored semantics are given in Tables 6 and 7. Intuitively, the mon-
itoring level is initially ⊥ and gets increased each time an input of higher level is crossed. The
reason why the monitoring level should take into account the level of inputs is that, as argued
in Section 4, the process s[1]?(2,x>).s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 is not secure. Hence it should not be safe
either. Moreover, if < Peµ , H > attempts to perform a communication action of level ` 6≥ µ ,
then < Peµ , H > †. We say in this case that the reduction produces error.
In the conditional (rules [MIf-T, MIf-F]) we can ignore the level ` of the tested expression and
keep the monitoring level µ unchanged. This is because in the process if e then P else Q, the
expression e can only be evaluated if all its variables have been instantiated by previous inputs,
thus the monitor is already greater than or equal to the level of all variables originally present in
e. On the other hand, if e originally contained only constants, then its level does not really matter.
In this way the process if true> then P else Q turns out to be safe even if P performs ⊥-actions,
provided P itself is safe.
The evaluation contexts E for monitored processes in rule [MCont] are defined as expected.
One may wonder whether monitored processes of the form Peµ11 | Peµ22 , where µ1 6= µ2, are
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really needed. The following example shows that, in the presence of concurrency, a single moni-
toring level (as used for instance in (Boudol, 2009)) would not be enough.
P ≡ Q ⇒ Peµ ≡ Qeµ (P | Q)eµ ≡ Peµ | Qeµ
M | 0eµ ≡M M |M′ ≡M′ |M (M |M′) |M′′ ≡M | (M′ |M′′)
(def D in P)eµ ≡ def D in Peµ
(def D in M) |M′ ≡ def D in (M |M′) def D in (def D′ in M)≡ def D′ in (def D in M)
M ≡M′ and H ≡ K ⇒ < M , H >≡< M′ , K >
C ≡ C′ ⇒ (νs)C ≡ (νs)C′ (νss′)C ≡ (νs′s)C
(ν s˜)< M , H > ‖(ν s˜′)< M′ , K > ≡ (ν ˜ss′)< M |M′ , H ∪K > if qn(H)∩qn(K) = /0
Table 5. Structural equivalence of monitored processes and configurations.
Example 5.1. (Need for multiple monitoring levels)
Suppose we could only use a single monitoring level for the parallel process P below, which
should intuitively be safe. Then a computation of Pe⊥ would be successful or not depending on
the order of execution of its parallel components:
P = a⊥[1](α1).P1 | a⊥[2](α2).P2 | a⊥[3](α3).P3 | a⊥[4](α4).P4 | a¯⊥[4]
P1 = α1!〈2, true⊥〉.0 P2 = α2?(1,x⊥).0
P3 = α3!〈4, true>〉.0 P4 = α4?(3,y>).0
Here, if P1 and P2 communicate first, we would have the successful computation:
Pe⊥(→∗(νs)< (P3{s[3]/α3} | P4{s[4]/α4})e⊥ , s : ε >(→ (νs)< 0e> , s : ε >
Instead, if P3 and P4 communicate first, then we would run into error:
Pe⊥(→∗(νs)< (P1{s[1]/α1} | P2{s[2]/α2})e> , s : ε > †
Intuitively, the monitoring level resulting from the communication of P3 and P4 should not con-
strain the communication of P1 and P2, since there is no causal dependency between them. Allow-
ing different monitoring levels for different parallel components, when P3 and P4 communicate
first we get:
Pe⊥(→∗(νs)< 0e> | (P1{s[1]/α1} | P2{s[2]/α2})e⊥ , s : ε >(→∗(νs)< 0e> | 0e⊥ , s : ε >
The following example justifies the levels of service names and the condition in rule [MLink].
Session initiation is the only synchronisation operation of our calculus. Since this synchronisa-
tion involves an initiator as well as a set of participants, the monitoring level of each of them
must be lower than or equal to the monitoring level of the starting session.
Example 5.2. (Need for levels on service names)
Consider the process:
s[2]?(1,x>).if x> then b¯`[2] else 0 | b`[1](β1).β1!〈2, true⊥〉.0 | b`[2](β2).β2?(1,y⊥).0
This process is ⊥-insecure, since if there is no >-message in the Q-set the process is blocked,
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if
⊔
i∈{1...n} µiunionsqµ ≤ ` then a`[1](α1).Peµ11 | ... | a`[n](αn).P
eµn
n | a¯`[n]eµ (→
(νs)< P1{s[1]/α1}e` | ... | Pn{s[n]/αn}e` , s : ε >
else a`[1](α1).P
eµ1
1 | ... | a`[n](αn).P
eµn
n | a¯`[n]eµ†
[MLink]
if µ ≤ ` then < s[p]!〈Π,e〉.Peµ , s : h >(→< Peµ , s : h · (p,Π,v`)>
else < s[p]!〈Π,e〉.Peµ , s : h > †
where e ↓ v` [MSend]
if µ ≤ ` then < s[q]?(p,x`).Peµ , s : (p,q,v`) ·h >(→< P{v/x}e` , s : h >
else < s[q]?(p,x`).Peµ , s : (p,q,v`) ·h > † [MRec]
if µ ≤ ` then < s[p]⊕` 〈Π,λ 〉.Peµ , s : h >(→< Peµ , s : h · (p,Π,λ `)>
else < s[p]⊕` 〈Π,λ 〉.Peµ , s : h > † [MLabel]
if µ ≤ ` then < s[q]&`(p,{λi : Pi}i∈I)eµ , s : (p,q,λ `i0) ·h >(→< P
e`
i0 , s : h >
else < s[q]&`(p,{λi : Pi}i∈I)eµ , s : (p,q,λ `i0) ·h > †
where i0 ∈ I [MBranch]
if e then P else Qeµ (→ Peµ if e ↓ true` if e then P else Qeµ (→ Qeµ if e ↓ false`
[MIf-T, MIf-F]
def X(x,α) = P in (X〈e,s[p]〉eµ |M)(→ def X(x,α) = P in ((P{v`/x}{s[p]/α})eµ |M)
where e ↓ v` [MDef]
< M , H >(→ (ν s˜)< M′ , H ′ > ⇒ < E [M] , H >(→ (ν s˜)< E [M′] , H ′ > [MCont]
C(→ (ν s˜)C′ and ¬C′′† ⇒ (ν s˜′)(C‖C′′)(→ (ν s˜′)(ν s˜)(C′ ‖C′′)
C† ⇒ (ν s˜)(C‖C′)† [MScop]
C ≡ C′ and C′(→ C′′ and C′′ ≡ C′′′ ⇒ C(→ C′′′
C† and C ≡C′ =⇒ C′† [MStruct]
Table 6. Monitored reduction rules for processes.
hence it has a null ⊥-behaviour, while if there is a >-message in the Q-set, there is a possibility
that the process subsequently exhibits a ⊥-action. Hence this process should be unsafe too. In-
deed, the monitoring level of the first component becomes > after the input and thus, assuming
the then branch of the conditional is taken, this branch must have monitoring level > as well.
Then, in order to start the session on service b`, Rule [MLink] requires>≤ `, i.e. `=>, and sets
the monitoring level of the continuation to `. This will block the output of the ⊥-value, raising
an error, and thus the process will turn out to be unsafe, as expected.
A similar example shows why we cannot avoid levels on choice operators.
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if
⊔
j∈{1...k} µp j unionsqµ ≤ `
then (a`[p1](αp1).P
eµp1
p1 | ... | a`[pk](αpk ).P
eµpk
pk | a¯`[n]eµ )  (a`[pk+1](αpk+1).0 | ... | a`[pn](αpn).0)
(→ (νs)< Pp1{s[p1]/αp1}e` | ... | Ppk{s[pk]/αpk}e` , s : ε >
else a`[p1](αp1).P
eµp1
p1 | ... | a`[pk](αpk ).P
eµpk
pk | a¯`[n]eµ†
where k < n [MExtLink1]
if
⊔
j∈{1...k} µp j ≤ `
then (a`[p1](αp1).P
eµp1
p1 | ... | a`[pk](αpk ).P
eµpk
pk )  (a`[pk+1](αpk+1).0 | ... | a`[pn](αpn).0 | a¯`[n] )
(→ (νs)< Pp1{s[p1]/αp1}e` | ... | Ppk{s[pk]/αpk}e` , s : ε >
else a`[p1](αp1).P
eµp1
p1 | ... | a`[pk](αpk ).P
eµpk
pk †
[MExtLink2]
< M  Z , H >(→ (ν s˜)< M′ , H ′ > ⇒ < E [M]  Z , H >(→ (ν s˜)< E [M′] , H ′ >
[MContTest]
< M , H >(→ (ν s˜)< M′ , H ′ > ⇒ < M  Z , H >(→ (ν s˜)< M′ , H ′ > [MDropTest]
Table 7. Monitored reduction rules for testers.
Example 5.3. (Need for levels on selection and branching)
Consider the process:
s[2]?(1,x>).s[2]⊕` 〈3,λ 〉.0 | s[3]&`(2,{λ : s[3]!〈1, true⊥〉.0})
This process is ⊥-insecure because if there is no >-message in the Q-set the process is blocked,
while if there is a >-message in the Q-set, the process will proceed with the selection/branching
and perform a ⊥-output. Thus this process should be unsafe too. By adding a level ` in the
selection/branching constructs and checking this level in Rules [MLabel] and [MBranch], we
allow the monitored semantics to block the computation before the ⊥-output. Indeed, if ` < >,
then Rule [MLabel] will raise an error, while if `=>, then both Rules [MLabel] and [MBranch]
will go through successfully and then [MSend] will raise an error.
6. Safety
In this section we introduce a property of safety for monitored processes, from which we derive
a property of safety also for processes. We then establish the two first results about this property,
namely that (1) safety implies the absence of run-time errors, and (2) safety is compositional for
both processes and monitored processes.
The remaining results, relating safety to security and typability, will be proven in Section 7
and Section 9, respectively.
A monitored process may be “relaxed” to a simple process by removing its monitoring levels.
Definition 6.1 (Demonitoring). If M is a monitored process, its demonitoring bMc is defined
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by:
bPeµc= P bM1 |M2c= bM1c | bM2c bdef D in Mc= def D in bMc
We may now define our safety property. Intuitively, a monitored process M is safe if it can mimic
at each step the transitions of the underlying process bMc.
Definition 6.2 (Monitored process safety). The safety predicate on monitored processes is
coinductively defined by:
M is safe if for any tester Z and monotone Q-set H such that < bMc , H > is saturated:
If < bMc  Z , H >; (ν s˜)< P , H ′ >
then < M  Z , H >(→ (ν s˜)< M′ , H ′ >, where bM′c= P and M′ is safe.
Definition 6.3 (Process safety). A process P is safe if Pe⊥ is safe.
We show now that if a process is safe, then none of its monitored computations starting with
H = /0 and monitor⊥ gives rise to error. This result rests on the observation that <M , H >(→
if and only if < bMc , H >−→ and ¬ < M , H > †, and that if M is safe, then whenever a
standard communication rule is applicable to bMc, the corresponding monitored communication
rule is applicable to M.
Proposition 6.4 ( Safety implies absence of run-time errors). If P is safe, then every monitored
computation:
< Pe⊥ , /0 >=< M0 , H0 >(→ (ν s˜1)< M1 , H1 >(→ ···(ν s˜k)< Mk , Hk >
is such that ¬ < Mk , Hk > †.
Proof. Note that<M , H >(→ (ν s˜)<M′ , H ′> implies< bMc , H >−→ (ν s˜)< bM′c , H ′>
and < M , H > † implies < bMc , H >−→ (ν s˜) < Q , H ′ > for some s˜, Q, H ′. In other words,
both < M , H >(→ (ν s˜) < M′ , H ′ > and < M , H > † imply that < bMc , H > can move.
Assume ad absurdum that < Mk , Hk > †. Then, corresponding to the monitored computation
< Pe⊥ , /0 >(→∗ (ν s˜k)< Mk , Hk >†, we would get
< P , /0 >−→∗ (ν s˜k)< bMkc , Hk >−→ (ν s˜k+1)< Q , Hk+1 >
for some s˜k+1, Q, Hk+1. By definition this implies that Pe⊥ is not safe, therefore P is not safe
either, contradicting our assumption.
Note that the converse of Proposition 6.4 does not hold, as shown by the next example. This
means that we could not use absence of run-time errors as a definition of safety, since that would
not be strong enough to guarantee our security property, which allows the pair ofL -equal Q-sets
to be refreshed at each step (while maintainingL -equality).
Example 6.5. Consider the process P:
P = a⊥[1](α1).P1 | a⊥[2](α2).P2 | a¯⊥[2]
P1 = α1!〈2, true>〉.α1?(2,x>).0
P2 = α2?(1,z>).if z> then α2!〈1, false>〉.0 else α2!〈1, true⊥〉.0
Note first that this process is not⊥-secure because after P1 has put the value true> in the Q-set,
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this value may be changed to false> while preserving L -equality of Q-sets, thus allowing the
else branch of P2 to be explored by the bisimulation. This process is not safe either, because our
definition of safety mimicsL -bisimulation by refreshing the Q-set at each step. By contrast, the
monitored execution of < Pe⊥ , /0 > uses at each step the Q-set produced at the previous step.
Therefore the monitored execution will never take the else branch and will always succeed.
Hence the simple absence of run-time errors is not sufficient by itself to enforce safety.
Intuitively, this discrepancy between safety and error-freedom is due to the fact that in Propo-
sition 6.4 a computation of < bMc , H > is assumed to proceed in isolation, in a static and
protected environment, while our notions of safety and security assume that processes evolve in
a dynamic and potentially hostile environment, where the Q-sets may vary at each step.
Let us turn now to the main result of this section, namely the compositionality of the safety
property. We start by proving that safety is compositional for monitored processes. The compo-
sitionality for processes will then follow as an easy corollary.
Theorem 6.6. If M1 and M2 are safe, then M1 |M2 is safe.
Proof. Let SMP be the set of safe monitored processes. Since SMP is defined coinductively,
it is enough to show that the set of parallel compositions of safe monitored processes:
ParSMP = {M = M1 |M2 | Mi is safe, for i = 1,2}
is closed with respect to the property of Definition 6.2 to obtain ParSMP ⊆ SMP. Namely, we
have to prove that, if M ∈ ParSMP, then for any tester Z and for any monotone Q-set H such
that < bMc , H > is saturated, the following holds:
If < bMc  Z , H >; (ν s˜)< P , H ′ >
then < M  Z , H >(→ (ν s˜)< M′ , H ′ >, where bM′c= P and M′ ∈ ParSMP.
Note that there is a 1-1 correspondence between the rules of the standard semantics and those
of the monitored semantics. For any rule [Rule] in the former, there is a corresponding rule
[MRule] in the latter. We proceed by case analysis on the rule [Rule] applied to infer the transition
< bMc , H >; (ν s˜)< P , H ′ >.
The interesting rules [Rule] are those for which [MRule] imposes some monitoring constraint,
namely the communication rules and the three Link rules. The case of a communication rule,
say [Send], is simple since the action comes from one of the two components bMic (i=1 or
i=2) and the tester is not used. Suppose the action comes from bM1c. In this case the transition
has the form < bM1 |M2c  Z , H > ;< P , H ′ > and it is deduced by Rule [DropTest] from
< bM1 |M2c , H >;<P , H ′>, where P=P1 | bM2c for some P1 such that< bM1c , H > −→
< P1 , H ′ >. Since M1 is safe, we have then < M1 , H > (→< M′1 , H ′ > by Rule [MSend],
where bM′1c= P1 and M′1 is safe. This implies < M1 |M2 , H >(→<M′1 |M2 , H ′ >, whence
by Rule [MDropTest] we deduce < M1 |M2  Z , H > (→< M′1 | M2 , H ′ >, which is the
required move since bM′1 |M2c= P1 | bM2c and M′1 |M2 ∈ ParSMP.
The case of the Link rules is more interesting. There are essentially two subcases, according to
whether the session participants and the initiator are all in the same Mi and possibly in the tester
or they come from both Mi and possibly from the tester. We prove the result for Rule [ExtLink1],
the proofs for Rules [Link] and [ExtLink2] being similar and simpler. We distinguish two cases:
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1 The initiator and a subset of the participants come from the same Mi and the remaining par-
ticipants come from the tester. Then the reasoning is similar to that for the communication
case above, using the safety of Mi and the Rules [ExtLink1] and [MExtLink1].
2 The participants and the initiator are scattered among the tester and both Mi. This is the most
interesting case, since we need to use a different tester Ti for each component Mi, whose role
is to simulate the other component.
Suppose M1 =∏ j∈J1 a
`[p j](αp j).P
(1)
p j
eµ j | a¯`[n]eµ and M2 =∏ j∈J2 a`[p j](αp j).P
(2)
p j
eµ j , where
{p j | j ∈ J1 ∪ J2} ⊆ {1, . . . ,n} and {p j | j ∈ J1} ∩ {p j | j ∈ J2} = /0. (Note that since all
participant roles are different, we cannot assume without loss of generality that the first #(J1)‖
participants come from M1 and the following #(J2) from M2.) Then the transition inferred
by means of Rule [ExtLink1] has the form bM1 |M2c  Z ; (νs)< P1 | P2 , s : ε >, where
P1 =∏ j∈J1 P
(1)
p j {s[p j]/αp j} and P2 =∏ j∈J2 P
(2)
p j {s[p j]/αp j}. Define now the two testers Z1 =
∏ j∈J2 a
`[p j](αp j).0 | Z and Z2 =∏ j∈J1 a`[p j](αp j).0 | a¯`[n] | Z. Then by construction bMic 
Zi ; (νs) < Pi , s : ε >. Since both Mi are safe, by Rule [MExtLink1] we get for each of
them a monitored transition Mi  Zi (→ (νs) < Pe`i , s : ε >, where both Pe`i are safe and⊔k1+k2
k=1 µ jk unionsqµ ≤ `. This implies (M1 |M2)  Z (→ (νs)< (P1 | P2)e` , s : ε >, which is the
required move since b(P1 | P2)e`c= P1 | P2 and Pe`1 | Pe`2 ∈ ParSMP.
Corollary 6.7. If P1 and P2 are safe, then P1 | P2 is safe.
Proof. By definition of safety, Pe⊥1 and P
e⊥
2 are safe. Then, by Theorem 6.6, also P
e⊥
1 | Pe⊥2 ≡
(P1 | P2)e⊥ is safe.
7. Relating Safety and Security
In this section we prove that safety implies security. As already discussed in the previous sections,
both these properties are persistent, namely they are required to hold in any reachable state of the
process, to take into account the possibility of intrusive observations (or “attacks”) in the course
of execution. However, note that safety is a property of individual computations, while security
is a property of the whole set of computations of a process. Hence proving that safety implies
security amounts to prove that a global property of the set of computations is implied by a local
property of each computation in the set.
In order to prove that safety implies security, we need some preliminary results.
Lemma 7.1 (Monotonicity of monitoring). Monitoring levels may only stay equal or increase
along execution: If 〈Peµ  Z,H〉(→ (ν s˜)〈P′eµ ′ ,H ′〉, then µ ≤ µ ′.
We define now the class of L -high processes, namely processes which always modify the
Q-sets in a way that is transparent forL -observers.
‖ We use #(J) to denote the cardinality of the set J.
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Definition 7.2 (L -highness of processes). A process P is L -high if for any monotone Q-set
H such that < P , H > is saturated and any tester Z it satisfies the property:
If < P  Z , H >; (ν s˜)< P′ , H ′ >, then H =L H ′ and P′ isL -high.
Lemma 7.3. If Peµ is safe and µ 6∈L , then P isL -high.
Proof. By induction on P. We only consider some interesting cases.
If P = s[p]!〈Π,e〉.P′, then < P , s : h >−→< P′ , s : h · (p,Π,v`) >, where e ↓ v`. From the
safety of Peµ we get that < Peµ , s : h >(→< P′eµ , s : h · (p,Π,v`) > and P′eµ is safe. This
means that µ ≤ `. Then, since µ 6∈L , also ` 6∈L and thus s : h =L s : h · (p,Π,v`). Finally, P′
isL -high by induction.
If P = s[q]?(p,x`).P′, then < P , s : (p,q,v`) ·h >−→< P′{v/x} , s : h >, which implies
< Peµ , s : (p,q,v`) ·h>(→< P′{v/x}e` , s : h> and µ ≤ ` and P′{v/x}e` is safe. Since µ 6∈L
implies ` 6∈L we get s : (p,q,v`) ·h =L s : h. Again, P′{v/x} isL -high by induction.
Lemma 7.4. If P = s[q]?(p,x`).P′ and P is safe, then Pe` is safe.
Proof. For any v of level `, P has a unique transition. Correspondingly, Pe⊥ has a monitored
transition < Pe⊥ , {s : (p,q,v`) · h} >(→< P′{v/x}e` , s : h >. Since P is safe, by definition
Pe⊥ is safe, therefore its residual P′{v/x}e` is safe. Then, since also< Pe` , {s : (p,q,v`) ·h}>(
→< P′{v/x}e` , s : h >, we may conclude that Pe` is safe.
We next define the bisimulation relation that will be used in the proof of soundness. Roughly,
all monitored processes with a high monitoring level are related, while the other processes are
related if they are congruent.
To define the bisimulation it is handy to consider monitored processes where monitors are
pushed as deeply as possible into terms, so that a single monitor never controls two processes in
parallel. This is formalised by the following mapping df, which essentially transforms a moni-
tored parallel composition of processes into a parallel composition of monitored processes.
Definition 7.5 (Distributed Form of monitored processes). The distributed form of a moni-
tored process M (notation df(M)) is defined by:
df(M) =

df(M1) | df(M2) if M = M1 |M2,
df(Peµ1 ) | df(Peµ2 ) if M = (P1 | P2)eµ and Pi 6≡ 0, i = 1,2
df(Peµi ) if M = (P1 | P2)eµ and Pj ≡ 0, i 6= j
def D in df(N) if M = def D in N,
def D in df(Peµ) if M = (def D in P)eµ ,
M otherwise.
It is easy to verify that df(M) ≡ M.
Definition 7.6 (Bisimulation for soundness proof: monitored processes). Given a downward-
closed set of security levelsL ⊆S , the relationRL◦ on monitored processes in distributed form
is defined inductively as follows:
M1RL◦ M2 if M1 and M2 are safe and one of the following holds:
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1 M1 = P
eµ1
1 , M2 = P
eµ2
2 , and µ1,µ2 6∈L ;
2 M1 = M2 = Peµ , and µ ∈L ;
3 Mi =∏mj=1 N
(i)
j , where ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, N(1)j RL◦ N(2)j follows from (1) or (2);
4 Mi = def D in Ni, where N1RL◦ N2.
Definition 7.7 (Bisimulation for soundness proof: processes). Given a downward-closed set
of security levelsL ⊆S , the relationRL on processes is defined by:
P1RL P2 if there are monitored processes in distributed form M1,M2
such that Pi ≡ bMic for i = 1,2 and M1RL◦ M2.
We may now show our main result, namely that safety implies security. The proof consists in
showing that safety impliesL –security, for anyL . The informal argument goes as follows. Let
“low” mean “in L ” and “high” mean “not in L ”. If P is not L –secure, this means that there
are two different observable low behaviours after a high input. This implies that in at least one of
the two computations there is some observable low action after the high input. But in this case
the monitored semantics will yield error, since it does so as soon as it meets an action of level
` 6≥ µ , where µ is the monitoring level of the executing component (which will have been set to
high after crossing the high input).
Theorem 7.8 (Safety implies security). If P is safe, P is also secure.
Proof. We prove that P isL –secure for anyL . The proof consists in showing that the relation
RL defined in Definition 7.7 is anL -bisimulation containing the pair (P,P) for any safe process
P. Note first that if P is safe, then PRL P because Pe⊥RL◦ Pe⊥ by Clause (2). Suppose now
that P1RL P2. This means that there exist monitored processes in distributed form M1,M2 such
that Pi ≡ bMic for i = 1,2 and M1RL◦ M2. Since processes and configurations are considered
modulo≡ we can assume without loss of generality that Pi = bMic for i= 1,2. Let H1,H2 be two
monotone Q-sets such that H1 =L H2 and < Pi , Hi > for i = 1,2 are saturated.
We want to show that for each tester Z and each reduction < P1  Z , H1 >; (ν s˜)< P′1 , H ′1 >,
either we have H ′1 =L H2 and P
′
1R P2, or < P2  Z , H2 >; · −→∗ (ν s˜) < P′2 , H ′2 >, where
H ′1 =L H
′
2 and P
′
1R
L◦ P′2.
We proceed by induction on the definition ofRL◦ (Definition 7.6).
— Clause (1). In this case M1 = P
eµ1
1 , M2 = P
eµ2
2 and µ1,µ2 6∈L . Suppose there is a transition
< P1  Z , H1 >; (ν s˜)< P′1 , H ′1 >. By Lemma 7.3, P1 is L -high, thus H ′1 =L H1. Since
P1 is safe, there exists µ ′1 such that < P
eµ1
1  Z , H1 >(→ (ν s˜)< P′1eµ
′
1 , H ′1 >, where P
′
1
eµ ′1
is safe (the fact that M1 is in distributed form ensures that the residual is of the form P′1
eµ ′1 ).
By Lemma 7.1, we have µ1 ≤ µ ′1, whence µ ′1 6∈ L . Then < P2 , H2 > may reply by the
empty move, since H ′1 =L H2 and P
′eµ ′1
1 R
L◦ P
eµ2
2 by Clause (1) again, whence P
′
1R
L P2 by
Definition 7.7.
— Clause (2). In this case M1 =M2 = Peµ , and µ ∈L , and the proof proceeds by case analysis
on the form of P. We examine some interesting cases. We will consider testers only when
they are necessary.
– Let Mi = a`[p](αp).Qpeµ , then P= a`[p](αp).Qp. Take Z =∏1≤q≤n,q6=p a`[q](αq).0 | a¯`[n],
where n is the arity of a. We can only reduce by applying rule [ExtLink2]. So we get
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< P  Z , H1 >; (νs) < Qp{s[p]/αp} , H1 ∪ {s : ε} >, where s is fresh. Now, this
can be matched by < P  Z , H2 > ; (νs) < Qp{s[p]/αp} , H2 ∪ {s : ε} >. From
H1 =L H2 we get H1 ∪ {s : ε} =L H2 ∪ {s : ε}. Since Peµ is safe, there is a transi-
tion < Peµ  Z , H1 >(→ < Qp{s[p]/αp}e` , H1∪{s : ε}> and Qp{s[p]/αp}e` is safe.
Hence Qp{s[p]/αp}e`RL◦ Qp{s[p]/αp}e` by Clause (1) if ` 6∈ L and by Clause (2) if
` ∈L . In both cases Qp{s[p]/αp}RLQp{s[p]/αp}.
– Let Mi = s[p]!〈Π,e〉.P′eµ and ∃v, ∃`≥ µ such that e ↓ v`. In this case P = s[p]!〈Π,e〉.P′
and the reduction < P , H1 >−→< P′ , H ′1 > is obtained by rule [Send]. Applicability
of rule [Send] assures that there is a queue s : h1 in H1. Since 〈P,H2〉 is saturated, there
will be a queue s : h2 in H2. If Hi = Ki ∪ s : hi, we have H ′1 = K1 ∪ s : h1 · (p,Π,v`), and
the matching move will be < P , H2 >−→< P′ , H ′2 >, where H ′2 = K2∪ s : h2 · (p,Π,v`).
Indeed, if ` /∈L then H ′1 =L H1 =L H2 =L H ′2. If ` ∈L then H ′1 =L H ′2 follows from
K1 =L K2 and s : h1 =L s : h2. Since Peµ is safe, we know that there is a monitored
transition < Peµ , H1 >(→< P′eµ , H ′1 > and that P′eµ is safe. Hence P′eµRL◦ P′eµ by
Clause (2) again, which implies P′RL P′.
– Let Mi = s[q]?(p,x`).P′eµ , where µ ≤ `. In this case P = s[q]?(p,x`).P′ and the move of
<P , H1 > is obtained by rule [Rec] and has the form<P , H1 >−→<P′{v/x} , H ′1 > for
some v such that the message (p,q,v`) occurs at the head of queue s in H1. As above, since
Peµ is safe, we know that < Peµ , H1 >(→ < P′{v/x}e` , H ′1 > and that P′{v/x}e` is
safe. Now, if ` 6∈L we get H ′1 =L H2 and Pe` is safe by Lemma 7.4. Then<P , H2 >may
reply by the empty move, since P′{v/x}e`RL◦ Pe` by Clause (1) and thus P′{v/x}RL P.
If ` ∈L , since H1 =L H2, the message (p,q,v`) must occur at the head of queue s also
in H2. Then, assuming Hi = Ki∪ s : (p,q,v`) ·hi, we have:
< P , K1∪ s : (p,q,v`) ·h1 >−→< P′{v/x} , K1∪ s : h1 >
< P , K2∪ s : (p,q,v`) ·h2 >−→< P′{v/x} , K2∪ s : h2 >
Here P′{v/x}e`RL◦ P′{v/x}e` by Clause (2), which implies P′{v/x}RL P′{v/x}. Lastly
H1 =L H2 implies K1∪ s : h1 =L K2∪ s : h2.
— Clause (3). Let Mi = ∏mj=1 N
(i)
j , where ∀ j (1≤ j ≤ m) we have N(1)j RL◦ N(2)j either by
Clause (1) or by Clause (2). This means that for each j, there exists µ j such that N
(i)
j =Q
(i)
j
eµ j
.
Then Pi =∏mj=1 Q
(i)
j and the move of< P1 , H1 > comes either from a single component Q
(1)
j ,
or from a group of k ≤ m components that synchronise to open an n-ary session on service
a`, possibly with the help of a tester. Using structural equivalence, we may assume that in
the first case the moving component is Q(1)1 , and in the second case the group of moving
components is ∏kj=1 Q
(1)
j , for some k ≤ m. We examine the two cases in turn.
(a) If Q(1)1 moves alone, then the move:
(/) < P1 , H1 >; (ν s˜)< Q′(1)1 | ∏mj=2 Q(1)j , H ′1 >
is deduced from < Q(1)1 , H1 >; (ν r˜)< Q′(1)1 , H ′1 >.
Since N(1)1 R
L◦ N
(2)
1 , by induction we have either i) H
′
1 =L H2 and Q
′(1)
1 R
L Q(2)1 , or
ii) < Q(2)1 , H2 >; · −→∗ (ν s˜)< Q′(2)1 , H ′2 > with Q′(1)1 RL Q′(2)1 and H ′1 =L H ′2.
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We consider the case ii), since the case i) is simpler. From ii) we infer:
(//) < P2 , H2 >; · −→∗ (ν s˜)< Q′(2)1 | ∏mj=2 Q(2)j , H ′2 >
Since the Mi are safe, corresponding to (/) and (//) we have:
< M1 , H1 >(→ (ν s˜)< N′(1)1 | ∏mj=2 N(1)j , H ′1 >
< M2 , H2 >(→∗ (ν s˜)< N′(2)1 | ∏mj=2 N(2)j , H ′2 >
where the M′i = N
′(i)
1 | ∏mj=2 N(i)j are again safe, bN′(i)j c= Q′(i)j and N′(1)1 RL◦ N′(2)1 .
Therefore N′(1)1 | ∏mj=2 N(1)j RL◦ N′(2)1 | ∏mj=2 N(2)j by Clause (3) again, from which we
derive Q′(1)1 | ∏mj=2 Q(1)j RL Q′(2)1 | ∏mj=2 Q(2)j . We conclude that (//) is the required
matching move.
(b) Here we assume that P1 =∏kj=1 Q
(1)
j | ∏mj=k+1 Q(1)j and that all the processes in∏kj=1 Q(1)j
synchronise, possibly with the help of the tester. Let us consider the case where the ap-
plied rule is [ExtLink1] (the proofs in the other cases are similar). Let k < n, Q(1)j =
a`[p j](αp j).R
(1)
p j for 1≤ j ≤ k−1 and Q(1)k = a¯`[n] and Z be the tester.
Suppose that the move of < P1  Z , H1 > is
(.) < P1  Z , H1 >;< P′1 , H1∪{s : ε}>
where P′1 = (νs)<∏
k−1
j=1 R
(1)
p j {s[p j]/αp j} | ∏nj=k+1 Q(1)j , H1∪{s : ε}> . Since M1 is safe,
<M1  Z , H1 > has a corresponding monitored transition deduced by Rule [MExtLink1]:
< M1  Z , H1 >(→ (νs)<∏k−1j=1 R(1)p j {s[p j]/αp j}e` | ∏mj=k+1 N(1)j , H1∪{s : ε}>
where unionsqkj=1µ j ≤ ` and the safety of M1 implies the safety of each R(1)p j {s[p j]/αp j}e`.
We distinguish now two cases, according to whether ` ∈L or ` 6∈L :
i) If ` ∈ L , then µ j ∈ L for each j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k. In this case we know that
N(1)j R
L◦ N
(2)
j follows from Clause (2), and hence N
(2)
j = a
`[p j](αp j).R
(1)
p j
eµ j for each
j such that 1≤ j ≤ k−1 and N(2)k = a¯`[n]eµk . This means that
P2 =∏k−1j=1 a
`[p j](αp j).R
(1)
p j | a¯`[n]eµk | ∏mj=k+1 Q(2)j . Then < P2 , H2 > has the follow-
ing move:
(..) < P2  Z , H2 >; (νs)<∏k−1j=1 R(1)p j {s[p j]/αp j} | ∏mj=k+1 Q(2)j , H2∪{s : ε}>
Since M2 is safe, < M2  Z , H2 > has a corresponding monitored transition:
< M2  Z , H2 >(→ (νs)<∏k−1j=1 R(1)p j {s[p j]/αp j}e` | ∏mj=k+1 N(2)j , H1∪{s : ε}>
Define now M′i =∏
k−1
j=1 R
(1)
p j {s[p j]/αp j}e` | ∏mj=k+1 N(i)j . Then, by Clause (2) we have
that R(1)p j {s[p j]/αp j}e`RL◦ R(1)p j {s[p j]/αp j}e` for each j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k−1, and
by hypothesis we have N(1)j R
L◦ N
(2)
j for each j such that k+ 1 ≤ j ≤ m, either by
Clause (1) or by Clause (2). Then M′1R
L◦ M′2 by Clause (3) and hence (..) is the
required matching transition for (.).
26
ii) If ` 6∈L , we may assume without loss of generality that there exists k′ ≤ k−1 such
that µ j ∈L for 1 ≤ j ≤ k′ and µ j 6∈L for k′+ 1 ≤ j ≤ k− 1. For the initiator we
could have µk ∈L or µk 6∈L . Note that it could be that µ j ∈L for each j such that
1≤ j≤ k−1, i.e. k′ = k−1, and µk ∈L . In this case we proceed as in case i) above,
except that we use Clause (1) to deduce Rp j{s[p j]/αp j}e`RL◦ Rp j{s[p j]/αp j}e` for
each j such that 1≤ j ≤ k−1.
So, let us assume that k′ < k−1 and µk 6∈L (the case where µk ∈L is similar and
simpler). Then N(1)j = N
(2)
j for 1≤ j ≤ k′, because N(1)j RL◦ N(2)j follows necessarily
from Clause (2). Instead, N(1)j R
L◦ N
(2)
j for k
′+ 1 ≤ j ≤ k follows necessarily from
Clause (1). Define now:
M′1 =∏
k−1
j=1 Rp j{s[p j]/αp j}e` | 0e` | ∏mj=k+1 N(1)j
M′2 =∏
k′
j=1 a[p j](αp j).Rp j
e` | ∏mj=k′+1 N(2)j
Note that the component 0e` in M′1 is used to match N
(2)
k in M
′
2. The safety of M1
implies the safety of all Rp j{s[p j]/αp j}e`, which in turn imply the safety of each
a`[p j](αp j).Rp j
e` for 1≤ j ≤ k′.
Notice that M′1R
L◦ M′2 by Clause (3), because the first k components are related by
Clause (1), and the remaining ones are related by hypothesis either by Clause (1) or
by Clause (2). Let P′′1 = bM′1c. Since P′′1 ≡ P′1 and P2 = bM′2c, by Definition 7.7 we
have P′1R
L P2. Thus, since H1∪{s : ε}=L H1 =L H2, we may use the empty move
of < P2 , H2 > to match the move (.) of < P1 , H1 >.
— Clause (4). If Rule [Def] is used to infer the transition of < P1  Z , H1 >, then, by definition
of distributed monitored processes, there is only one monitor controlling the process variable
which is replaced. Therefore we can use Clause (1) or (2). Otherwise, Rule [Cont] is used
and induction applies.
The converse of Theorem 7.8 does not hold, as shown by the process R of Example 4.12, or
by the following more classical example:
Example 7.9. (Secure unsafe process) Consider the process P = P1 | P2, whose second partici-
pant contains a high conditional that emits two equal low messages in its branches.
P1 = def X(x,α) = Q1 in X〈true>,s[1]〉
P2 = def Y (y,β ) = Q2 in Y 〈false⊥,s[2]〉
where Q1 =α!〈2,x〉.X(x,α) and Q2 = β?(1,z>).if z> then β !〈3,y〉.Y (y,β ) else β !〈3,y〉.Y (y,β ).
Let us first argue that this process is secure. Notice that, since the first participant persistently
emits the message (1,2, true>), the input of the second participant is always enabled: then, even
considering the worst case where P is run with the ⊥-equal Q-sets H1 = {s : (1,2, false>)} and
H2 = {s : ε}, the moves:
< P , H1 >−→∗< P1 | def Y (y,β ) = Q2 in if false> then Q else Q , {s : ε}>
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where Q = s[2]!〈3, false⊥〉.Y 〈false⊥,s[2]〉, can be simulated by:
< P , H2 >−→∗< P , {s : (1,2, true>)}>−→∗
< P1 | def Y (y,β ) = Q2 in if true> then Q else Q , {s : ε}>
and clearly the two continuations are ⊥-bisimilar, since without touching the Q-set they both
evolve to
P1 | def Y (y,β ) = Q2 in Q
On the other hand, P is clearly not safe since in both branches of the conditional it tries to
perform a ⊥-output after having set the monitor to > when receiving the >-input.
8. Type System
In this section we present our security type system, which will be shown to imply safety. This
type system is a restriction to our calculus of the system given for a richer calculus in (Capecchi
et al., 2013), to which we refer for motivations, explanations and the proof of subject reduction.
8.1. Typing expressions and processes
As standard for typing processes we need two kinds of types, global types and session types.
Global G ::= p→Π : 〈S`〉.G communication
| p→Π : {λi : Gi}`i∈I choice
| t variable
| µt.G recursive
| end end
Session T ::= !〈Π,S`〉;T send
| ?(p,S`);T receive
| ⊕`〈Π,{λi : Ti}i∈I〉 selection
| &`(p,{λi : Ti}i∈I) branching
| µt.T recursive
| t variable
| end end
Sorts S ::= bool | . . .
Table 8. Global and session types.
The grammar of global and session types is given in Table 8. Global types represent the whole
session protocol and session types correspond to the communication actions, representing each
participant’s contribution to the session. We comment on global types and session types in turn.
The communication type p→Π : 〈S`〉.G says that participant p multicasts a message of type S
and level ` to all participants in Π and then the interactions described in G take place. The choice
type p→Π : {λi : Gi}`i∈I says that participant p multicasts one of the labels λi to the participants
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inΠ. If λ j is sent, interactions described in G j take place. Type µt.G is a recursive type, where the
type variable t is guarded in the standard way. Type end represents the termination of a session.
The send type !〈Π,S`〉;T expresses the sending to all participants inΠ of a value of type S and
of level `, followed by the communications described in T . The selection type⊕`〈Π,{λi : Ti}i∈I〉
represents the transmission to all participants in Π of a label λ j in {λi | i ∈ I}, followed by
the communications described in Tj. The receive and branching types are dual to the send and
selection ones. Recursive types µt.G and µt.T are considered modulo folding and unfolding.
The relation between global types and session types is formalised by the notion of projec-
tion (Honda et al., 2008). The projection of G onto q, denoted (G  q), gives participant q’s view
of the protocol described by G. It is defined by induction on global types in Table 9. For the
choice global type, the condition Gi  q= G j  q for all i, j ∈ I assures that the projections of all
the participants not involved in the branching are identical session types.
(p→Π : 〈S`〉.G′)  q=

!〈Π,S`〉;(G′  q) if q= p,
?(p,S`);(G′  q) if q ∈Π,
G′  q otherwise.
(p→Π : {λi : Gi}`i∈I)  q=

⊕`(Π,{λi : Gi  q}i∈I) if q= p
&`(p,{λi : Gi  q}i∈I) if q ∈Π
G1  q if q 6= p,q 6∈Π and Gi  q= G j  q ∀i, j ∈ I.
(µt.G′)  q=
{
µt.(G′  q) if q occurs in G′,
end otherwise.
t  q= t end  q= end
Table 9. Projection of global types on participants.
Meet( !〈Π,S`〉;T ) = `uMeet(T ) Meet(?(p,S`);T ) = ` Meet(⊕`〈Π,{λi : Ti}i∈I〉) = `
Meet(&`(p,{λi : Ti}i∈I)) = ` Meet(µt.T ) =Meet(T ) Meet(t) =Meet(end) =>
Table 10. Meet of session types.
The typing judgments for expressions are of the form:
Γ ` e : S`
where Γ is the standard environment which maps variables with security levels to sort types
with the same security levels, service names with security levels to global types with the same
security levels, and process variables to pairs of sort types with their security levels and session
types. Formally, we define:
Γ ::= /0 | Γ,x` : S` | Γ,a` : G` | Γ,X : S` T
assuming that we can write Γ,x` : S`′ only if x does not occur in Γ, that is, standard environments
should not contain the same variable twice. Similarly for Γ,a` : G` and Γ,X : S` T .
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Γ `` P.∆ `′ ≤ `
bSUBSc
Γ ``′ P.∆
∆ end only
bINACTc
Γ `> 0.∆
Γ `` P.∆ Γ `` Q.∆′
bCONCc
Γ `` P | Q.∆,∆′
Γ ` e : bool`′ Γ `` P.∆ Γ `` Q.∆ bIFc
Γ `` if e then P else Q.∆
Γ ` e : S` `′ =Meet(T ) ∆ end only
bVARc
Γ,X : S` T ``u`′ X〈e,c〉.∆,c : T
Γ,X : S` T,x` : S` ``u`′ P.{α : T} `′ =Meet(T ) Γ,X : S` T ``′′ Q.∆ bDEFc
Γ ``′′ def X(x,α) = P in Q.∆
n is the arity of a
bMINITc
Γ,a` : G` `` a¯`[n]. /0
Γ,a` : G` `` P.∆,α : G  p
bMACCc
Γ,a` : G` `` a`[p](α).P.∆
Γ ` e : S` Γ ``′ P.∆,c : T `′ ≤ `
bSENDc
Γ ``′ c!〈Π,e〉.P.∆,c : !〈Π,S`〉;T
Γ,x` : S` `` P.∆,c : T
bRCVc
Γ `` c?(p,x`).P.∆,c :?(p,S`);T
Γ `` P.∆,c : Tj j ∈ I `≤ `′ ≤
l
i∈I
Meet(Ti)
bSELc
Γ `` c⊕`
′ 〈Π,λ j〉.P.∆,c :⊕`′〈Π,{λi : Ti}i∈I〉
Γ `` Pi .∆,c : Ti `≤
l
i∈I
Meet(Ti)
bBRANCHc
Γ `` c&`(p,{λi : Pi}i∈I).∆,c : &`(p,{λi : Ti}i∈I)
Table 11. Typing rules for processes.
We type values by decorating their types with their security levels, and variables/service names
according to Γ:
Γ ` true`, false` : bool` Γ,x` : S` ` x` : S` Γ,a` : S` ` a` : S`
We type expressions by decorating their types with the join of the security levels of the vari-
ables and values they are built from. For example a typing rule for and is:
Γ ` e1 : bool`1 Γ ` e2 : bool`2
Γ ` e1 and e2 : bool`1unionsq`2
The meet of session types (Table 10) takes into account the lowest level of exchanged values
and choices. Notice that only for the send type we need to consider the “future" exchanges, since
the typing rules for the other constructors already do this job (see Table 11). The meet is used in
the type system rules bSELc and bBRANCHc for information flow control (see Table 11).
The typing judgments for processes are of the form:
Γ `` P.∆
where ∆ is a process environment which associates session types with channels:
∆ ::= /0 | ∆,c : T
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The merge “∆,∆′” of process environments is defined only if dom(∆)∩ dom(∆′) = /0, where
dom( ) is as expected.
We decorate the derivation symbol ` with the security level ` inferred for the process: this
level is a lower bound for the communications performed in the process. The set of typing rules
for processes is given in Table 11.
bSUBSc is the classical subtyping rule of security type systems. It is crucial for some rule
premises to hold, since it allows the security level inferred for a process to be decreased.
bINACTc gives security level > to 0 since a terminated process cannot leak any information;
in the premise, “∆ end only” means that each channel in dom(∆) has session type end.
bCONCc allows the parallel composition of two processes P,Q to be typed if both processes
are typable and their process environments have disjoint domains.
bIFc requires that the two branches P,Q of a conditional be typed with the same process
environment ∆, and with the same security level `. This rule is consistent with the monitored
semantics rules bMIF-Tc bMIF-Fc which do not raise the monitoring level when executing a
conditional. Indeed, the classical requirement that the security level `′ of the tested expression
be less than or equal to the security level ` of the branches is not needed here because the pro-
cess if e then P else Q can only be executed if the expression e can be evaluated, and this is the
case only if all the variables occurring in e have been instantiated by previous inputs. Since these
inputs guard the conditional, the join of their levels will be less than or equal to ` by Rule bRCVc.
bVARc types X〈e,c〉with a level which is the meet of the security levels of expression e and the
security levels of the communications performed on channel c. In this way we take into account
the levels of all communications which can be performed by a process bound to X .
In bDEFc the process P is typed with the meet of the security levels associated with x and α ,
in agreement with rule bVARc. The levels of P and Q can be unrelated, since it is possible that X
does not occur in Q. Clearly if X occurs in Q we get `′′ ≤ `u `′.
In rules bMINITc and bMACCc the standard environment must associate with the identifier a
a global type. In bMINITc the emptiness of the process environment in the conclusion specifies
that there is no further communication behaviour after the initiator. In bMACCc the premise
guarantees that the type of the channel α in P is the p-th projection of the global type G of a.
Concerning security levels, in bMACCc we check that the continuation process P conforms to
the security level ` associated with the service name a.
bSENDc types the sending of a basic value followed by the process P. The premise makes
sure that i) the expression e has type S` in Γ, where ` is the join of all variables and values in
e, and ii) P is typable in Γ. The condition `′ ≤ ` is not a constraint on P, since whatever level
`′′ is inferred for P, it can always be downgraded to such an `′; this condition simply ensures
that the output process cannot be typed with a level higher than or incomparable with `, thus
preserving the invariant that the level `′ of a process is a lower bound for all security levels of its
communications.
bRCVc is the dual of rule bSENDc but it is more restrictive, in that it requires the continuation
P to be typable with level `. This means that P cannot have any actions of level lower than or
incomparable with `. This rule forbids a >-input followed by a ⊥-output, for instance.
bSELc types a selecting process with the level associated with the selection operator, which is
less than or equal to the meets of the types in the different possible continuations. bBRANCHc is
the dual of the bSELc rule.
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8.2. Typing queues and Q-sets
We type queues by describing the messages they contain: message types represent the messages
contained in the queues, see Table 12. The message value send type !〈Π,S`〉, expresses the
communication to all p∈Π of a value of type S`. The message selection type⊕`〈Π,λ 〉 represents
the communication to all p ∈ Π of the label λ with level ` and T;T′ represents sequencing of
message types (we assume associativity for ;).
In order to take into account the structural congruence on queues given in Table 2, we consider
message types modulo the equivalence relation ≈ induced by the rules shown in Table 12 (with
\ ∈ {!,⊕`} and A ∈ {S`,λ}).
Message T ::= !〈Π,S`〉 message send
| T;T′ message sequence
| ⊕`〈Π,λ 〉 message selection
T; \〈Π,A〉; \′〈Π′,A〉;T′ ≈ T; \′〈Π′,A〉; \〈Π,A〉;T′ if Π∩Π′ = /0
T; \〈Π,A〉;T′ ≈ T; \〈Π′,A〉; \〈Π′′,A〉;T′ if Π=Π′∪Π′′,Π′∩Π′′ = /0
Table 12. Message types and equivalence relation on message types.
bQINITc
Γ ` s : ε . /0
Γ ` s : h.Θ Γ ` v` : S
bQSENDc
Γ ` s : h · (p,Π,v`).Θ;{s[p] : !〈Π,S〉}
Γ ` s : h.Θ
bQSELc
Γ ` s : h · (p,Π,λ `).Θ;{s[p] :⊕`〈Π,λ 〉}
Γ ` s : h.Θ Θ≈Θ′
bQCONGc
Γ ` s : h.Θ′
bQSINITc
Γ ` /0 /0 . /0
Γ `Σ H .Θ Γ ` s : h.Θ′ bQSUNIONc
Γ `Σ,s H ∪{s : h} .Θ,Θ′
Table 13. Typing rules for queues and Q-sets.
Typing judgments for queues have the shape
Γ ` s : h.Θ
where Θ is a queue environment associating message types with channels with role:
Θ ::= /0 |Θ,s[p] : T
Typing judgments for Q-sets have the shape:
Γ `Σ H .Θ
where Σ is the set of session names which occur in H.
The equivalence ≈ on message types can be trivially extended to queue environments:
{s[pi] : Ti | i ∈ I} ≈ {s[pi] : T′i | i ∈ I} if Ti ≈ T′i for all i ∈ I
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Typing rules for queues and Q-sets are given in Table 13. The composition “;” of queue envi-
ronments is defined by:
Θ;Θ′ = {s[p] : T;T′ | s[p] : T ∈Θ and s[p] : T′ ∈Θ′}∪
{s[p] : T | s[p] : T ∈Θ and s[p] 6∈ dom(Θ′)}∪
{s[p] : T′ | s[p] 6∈ dom(Θ) and s[p] : T′ ∈Θ′}
In Table 13, the merge “Σ,Σ′” of name sets and the merge “Θ,Θ′” of queue environments are
defined only if Σ∩Σ′ = /0 and dom(Θ)∩dom(Θ′) = /0, respectively.
8.3. Typing configurations
Typing judgments for runtime configurations C have the form:
Γ `Σ C . < ∆Θ>
They associate with a configuration the environments ∆ and Θ mapping channels to session and
message types, respectively. We call < ∆Θ> a configuration environment.
A configuration type is a session type, or a message type, or a message type followed by a
session type:
Configuration T ::= T session
| T;T continuation | T message
Since channels with role occur both in processes and in queues, a configuration environment
associates configuration types with these channels.
Definition 8.1. The configuration type of a channel s[p] in a configuration environment
< ∆Θ> (notation < ∆Θ> (s[p]) ) is defined by:
< ∆Θ> (s[p]) =

T;T if s[p] : T ∈Θ and s[p] : T ∈ ∆,
T if s[p] : T ∈Θ and s[p] 6∈ dom(∆),
T if s[p] 6∈ dom(Θ) and s[p] : T ∈ ∆,
end otherwise.
Configuration types can be projected on participants (notation T  q ), see Table 14.
We also define a duality relation ./ between projections of configuration types, which holds
when opposite communications are offered (input/output, selection/branching).
Definition 8.2. The duality relation between projections of configuration types is the minimal
symmetric relation which satisfies:
end ./ end t ./ t T ./ T ′ ⇒ µt.T ./ µt.T ′
∀i ∈ I Ti ./ T ′i ⇒ ⊕`{λi : Ti}i∈I ./ &`{λi : T ′i }i∈I
T ./ T ⇒ !S`;T ./ ?S`;T
∃i ∈ I λ = λi and T ./ Ti ⇒ ⊕`λ ;T ./ &`{λi : Ti}i∈I
The above definitions are needed to state coherence of configuration environments. Informally,
this holds when the inputs and the branchings offered by the process agree both with the outputs
and the selections offered by the process and with the messages in the queues. More formally:
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( !〈Π,S`〉;T )  q=
{
!S`;T  q if q ∈Π,
T  q otherwise.
(?(p,S`);T )  q=
{
?S`;T  q if q= p,
T  q otherwise.
(⊕`〈Π,λ 〉;T )  q=
{
⊕`λ ;T  q if q ∈Π,
T  q otherwise.
(⊕`〈Π,{λi : Ti}i∈I〉)  q=
{
⊕`{λi : Ti  q}i∈I if q ∈Π,
T1  q otherwise.
(&`(p,{λi : Ti}i∈I))  q=
{
&`{λi : Ti  q}i∈I if q= p,
T1  q otherwise.
(µt.T )  q=
{
µt.(T  q) if q occurs in T,
end otherwise.
t  q= t end  q= end
Table 14. Projection of configuration types on participants.
Definition 8.3. A configuration environment < ∆Θ > is coherent if s[p] ∈ dom(∆)∪dom(Θ)
and s[q] ∈ dom(∆)∪dom(Θ) imply
< ∆Θ> (s[p])  q ./ < ∆Θ> (s[q])  p
It can be easily shown that typing rules assure that configurations are always typed with coherent
environments.
Γ `` P.∆ Γ `Σ H .Θ < ∆Θ> is coherent bCINITc
Γ `Σ< P , H > . < ∆Θ>
Γ `Σ1 C1 . < ∆1 Θ1 > Γ `Σ2 C2 . < ∆2 Θ2 > < ∆1,∆2 Θ1,Θ2 > is coherent bCPARc
Γ `Σ1,Σ2 C1‖C2 . < ∆1,∆2 Θ1,Θ2 >
Γ `Σ C . < ∆Θ> bGSRESc
Γ `Σ\s (νs)C . < ∆\ sΘ\ s >
Table 15. Typing rules for configurations.
The typing rules for configurations are given in Table 15, where Σ\s, ∆\s andΘ\s are defined
as expected:
Σ\ s = {s′| s′ ∈ Σ and s′ 6= s} ∆\ s = {s′[p] : T | s′[p] : T ∈ ∆ and s′ 6= s}
Θ\ s = {s′[p] : T| s′[p] : T ∈Θ and s′ 6= s}.
8.4. Subject reduction
Since process and queue environments represent future or ongoing communications, by reduc-
ing processes we get different configuration environments. This is formalised by the notion of
reduction of configuration environments, denoted by < ∆Θ> ⇒ < ∆′ Θ′ >.
Definition 8.4 (Reduction of configuration environments). Let⇒ be the reflexive and transi-
tive relation on configuration environments generated by:
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1 < {s[p] : !〈Π,S`〉; T}Θ> ⇒ < {s[p] : T}Θ;{s[p] : !〈Π,S`〉}>
2 < {s[p] :⊕`〈Π,{λi : Ti}i∈I〉}Θ> ⇒ < {s[p] : Tj}Θ;{s[p] :⊕`(Π,λ j)}> ( j ∈ I)
3 < {s[q] :?(p,S`); T}{s[p] : !〈q,S`〉};Θ> ⇒ < {s[q] : T}Θ>
4 < {s[q] : &`(p,{λi : Ti}i∈I)}{s[p] :⊕`(q,λ j)};Θ> ⇒ < {s[q] : Tj}Θ> ( j ∈ I)
5 < ∆,∆′′ Θ> ⇒ < ∆′,∆′′ Θ′ > if < ∆Θ> ⇒ < ∆′ Θ′ >
where message types are considered modulo the equivalence relation of Table 12.
The first two rules correspond to participant p putting a value or a label in the queue. The fol-
lowing two rules correspond to participant q reading a value or a label from the queue. The last
rule is contextual: notice that we add only statements to the process environments, since only one
statement is considered in the first four reduction rules, while we do not need to add statements
to the queue environments, which are always arbitrary.
We are now able to state the result of type preservation under reduction. For the proof we
refer to (Capecchi et al., 2013), where a similar type system was presented for a richer calculus
(including declassification, delegation, as well as exchange and restriction of service names).
Theorem 8.5 (Subject Reduction). Suppose Γ `Σ C . < ∆Θ> and C −→∗ C′. Then
Γ `Σ C′ . < ∆′ Θ′ > with < ∆Θ> ⇒ < ∆′ Θ′ >. Moreover if C =< P , H >,
C′ =< P′ , H ′ > and Γ `` P.∆, then Γ `` P′ .∆′.
Our type system also preserves the fundamental properties ensured by classical session types,
i.e. linearity of communications inside sessions and absence of communication mismatches. This
is easy to see, once we observe that our type system projects down to the classical session type
system of (Bettini et al., 2008) when we ignore security levels and associated type constraints.
We shall therefore concentrate here on establishing the soundness of our type system for safety.
9. Relating Safety and Typability
In this section we complete the picture set up in Section 7 by showing that typability implies
safety. As a result, the relation among our three approaches for information flow analysis in
multiparty sessions can be summarised as follows: typability⇒ safety⇒ security.
We consider substitutions, ranged over by σ , which map value variables to values and channel
variables to channels with role. We say that σ agrees with Γ if Γ ` x` : S` implies Γ ` σ(x) : S`.
It is easy to verify that Γ `` P.∆ implies Γ `` σ(P).σ(∆) for all σ that agree with Γ.
We prove now the following theorem, from which our result will follow as an easy corollary.
Theorem 9.1. If Γ `` P.∆ for some Γ, ∆, then σ(P)e` is safe for all σ which agree with Γ.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ `` P.∆ and then by case analysis on the last rule
applied to infer the transition < σ(P)  Z , H >; (ν s˜)< P′ , H ′ >, where Z is any tester.
Γ `` P.∆ `′ ≤ `
bSUBSc
Γ ``′ P.∆
Inspecting the rules of Table 7 it is easy to verify that if σ(P)e` reduces,
then σ(P)e`′ reduces too for all `′ ≤ `. Therefore by definition the safety of σ(P)e` implies the
safety of σ(P)e`′ for all `′ ≤ `.
∆ end only bINACTc
Γ `> 0.∆
Since 0 cannot reduce, by definition 0e` is trivially safe for all `.
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Γ `` P.∆ Γ `` Q.∆′
bCONCc
Γ `` P | Q.∆,∆′
By induction σ(P)e` and σ(Q)e` are safe. The safety of σ(P)e`
and σ(Q)e` implies the safety of σ(P | Q)e` by compositionality (Corollary 6.7).
Γ ` e : bool`′ Γ `` P.∆ Γ `` Q.∆ bIFc
Γ `` if e then P else Q.∆
By induction σ(P)e` and σ(Q)e` are safe. The pro-
cess if e then P else Q reduces only if either σ(e) ↓ true`′ or σ(e) ↓ false`′ . Then, taking the case
σ(e) ↓ true`′ , the reduction if σ(e) then σ(P) else σ(Q)−→ σ(P) can be mimicked by
if σ(e) then σ(P) else σ(Q)e`(→ σ(P)e`. Similarly for the case σ(e) ↓ false`′ .
Γ ` e : S` `′ =Meet(T ) ∆ end only bVARc
Γ,X : S` T ``u`′ X〈e,c〉.∆,c : T
The process X〈e,c〉 cannot reduce, so X〈e,c〉e` is
trivially safe for all `.
Γ,X : S` T,x` : S` ``u`′ P.{α : T} `′ =Meet(T ) Γ,X : S` T ``′′ Q.∆ bDEFc
Γ ``′′ def X(x,α) = P in Q.∆
The process
def X(x,α) = σ(P) in σ(Q) can reduce only if σ(Q)≡ X〈e,s[p]〉 | Q′. In this case it reduces to
σ(P){v/x}{s[p]/α} | Q′, where e↓v` and Γ ` v` : S`. Notice that x and α are bound, so they can-
not occur in the domain of σ , and the substitution σ{v/x}{s[p]/α} agrees with Γ,X : S` T,x` : S`
whenever σ agrees with Γ. So by induction σ(P){v/x}{s[p]/α}e`u`′ and σ(Q)e`′′ are safe.
Since X〈e,s[p]〉 | Q′ must be typed using rules bVARc and bCONCc, we get `′′ ≤ `u `′, thus
σ(P){v/x}{s[p]/α}e`′′ is safe. The safety of σ(Q)e`′′ implies by definition the safety of σ(Q′)e`′′ .
The safety of σ(P){v/x}{s[p]/α}e`′′ and Qe`′′ imply the safety of σ(P){v/x}{s[p]/α} | Q′e`′′ by
compositionality (Corollary 6.7).
In the monitored semantics we have def X(x,α)=P in σ(Q)e`
′′(→σ(P){v/x}{s[p]/α} |Q′e`′′ .
Therefore def X(x,α) = P in σ(Q)e`
′′
is safe.
n is the arity of a
bMINITc
Γ,a` : G` `` a¯`[n]. /0
The process a¯`[n] reduces to (νs)< 0 , s : ε > with the tester which
contains all the required n participants. In the monitored semantics too, the process a¯`[n]e` with
the same tester reduces to (νs)< 0 , s : ε >e`, so a¯`[n]e` is safe.
Γ,a` : G` `` P.∆,α : G  p
bMACCc
Γ,a` : G` `` a`[p](α).P.∆
The process a`[p](α).σ (P) reduces to
(νs) < σ(P){s[p]/α} , s : ε > with the tester which contains all the other participants and
the initiator. By induction σ(P){s[p]/α}e` is safe. In the monitored semantics too, the process
a`[p](α).σ(P)e` with the same tester reduces to (νs) < σ(P){s[p]/α} , s : ε >e`. Therefore
a`[p](α).σ(P)e` is safe.
Γ ` e : S` Γ ``′ P.∆,c : T `′ ≤ `
bSENDc
Γ ``′ c!〈Π,e〉.P.∆,c : !〈Π,S`〉;T
To reduce, the process s[p]!〈Π,σ(e)〉.σ(P) needs
a queue s : h. If σ(e) ↓ v` we have < s[p]!〈Π,σ(e)〉.σ(P) , s : h>−→< σ(P) , s : h · (p,Π,v`)>.
By induction σ(P)e`′ is safe. Similarly, in the monitored semantics,
< s[p]!〈Π,σ(e)〉.σ(P)e`′ , s : h > reduces to < σ(P)e`′ , s : h · (p,Π,v`)>, since by hypothesis
`′ ≤ `. Thus s[p]!〈Π,σ(e)〉.σ(P)e`′ is safe.
Γ,x` : S` `` P.∆,c : T
bRCVc
Γ `` c?(p,x`).P.∆,c :?(p,S`);T
To reduce the process c?(p,x`).σ(P) we need a queue
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s : (p,q,v`) · h, i.e. we have < s[q]?(p,x`).σ(P) , s : (p,q,v`) · h >−→< σ(P){v/x} , s : h >.
If the configuration < s[q]?(p,x`).σ(P) , s : (p,q,v`) · h > is well typed we have Γ ` v` : S`,
and therefore the substitution σ{v/x} agrees with Γ,x` : S` whenever σ agrees with Γ. We
get by induction that σ(P){v/x}e` is safe. In the monitored semantics also the configuration
< c?(p,x`).σ(P)e` , s : (p,q,v`) ·h > reduces to < σ(P){v/x}e` , s : h >, so c?(p,x`).σ(P)e` is
safe.
Γ `` P.∆,c : Tj j ∈ I `≤ `′ ≤
l
i∈I
Meet(Ti)
bSELc
Γ `` c⊕`′ 〈Π,λ j〉.P.∆,c :⊕`′〈Π,{λi : Ti}i∈I〉
Similar to the case of rule bSENDc.
Γ `` Pi .∆,c : Ti `≤
l
i∈I
Meet(Ti)
bBRANCHc
Γ `` c&`(p,{λi : Pi}i∈I).∆,c : &`(p,{λi : Ti}i∈I)
Similar to the case of rule bRCVc.
Corollary 9.2. If Γ `` P.∆ for some Γ, ∆, `, then σ(P) is safe for all σ which agree with Γ.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 9.1, since the safety of σ(P)e` implies the safety
of σ(P)e⊥, and by definition process σ(P) is safe if the monitored process σ(P)e⊥ is safe.
Clearly completeness fails, since there are safe processes which cannot be typed, a simple
example being if true> then s[1]!〈2, true>〉.0 else s[1]!〈2, false⊥〉.0.
Notice that also if true> then s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0 else s[1]!〈2, false>〉.0 is safe (in spite of the level⊥
in the chosen branch), because the conditional does not raise the monitor level. Indeed, it would
be weird to view this program as unsafe, given that it always behaves like s[1]!〈2, true⊥〉.0.
10. Conclusion
We have proposed a monitored semantics to prevent runtime information leaks in a multiparty
session calculus. We have shown that the safety property induced by this semantics is strictly
included between the typability property and a refinement of the security property considered for
an extended calculus in (Capecchi et al., 2013) (actually this refinement was already introduced
in the Appendix of that paper).
There is a wide literature on the use of monitors (frequently in combination with types) for
assuring security, but most of this work has focussed so far on sequential computations, see
for instance (Guernic et al., 2007; Boudol, 2009; Sabelfeld and Russo, 2010). More specifically,
(Guernic et al., 2007) considers an automaton-based monitoring mechanism for information flow,
combining static and dynamic analyses, for a sequential imperative while-language with outputs.
The paper (Boudol, 2009), which provided one of the inspirations for our work, deals with an
ML-like language and uses a single monitoring level to control sequential executions. The work
(Askarov and Sabelfeld, 2009) shows how to enforce information-release policies, which may be
viewed as relaxations of noninterference, by a combination of monitoring and static analysis, in
a sequential language with dynamic code evaluation. Dynamic security policies and means for
expressing them via security labels have been studied for instance in (Myers and Liskov, 2000;
Zheng and Myers, 2007).
In session calculi, concurrency is present not only among participants in a given session, but
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also among different sessions running in parallel and possibly involving some common partners.
Hence, different monitoring levels are needed to control different parallel components, and these
levels must be joined when the components convene to start a new session. As we use a general
lattice of security levels (rather than a two level lattice as it is often done), it may happen that
while all the participants monitors are “low”, their join is “high”, constraining all their exchanges
in the session to be high too. Furthermore, we deal with structured memories (the Q-sets). In this
sense, our setting is slightly more complex than some of the previously studied ones. Moreover,
a peculiarity of session calculi is that data with different security levels are transmitted on the
same channel†† (which is also the reason why security levels are assigned to data, and not to
channels). Hence, although the intuition behind monitors is rather simple, its application to our
calculus is not completely straightforward.
Session types have been proposed for a variety of calculi and languages. We refer to (Dezani-
Ciancaglini and de’ Liguoro, 2010) for a survey on the session type literature. However, the
integration of security requirements into session calculi is still at an early stage. Enforcement of
integrity properties in multiparty sessions, using session types, has been studied in (Bhargavan
et al., 2009; Planul et al., 2009). These papers propose a compiler which, given a multiparty ses-
sion description, implements cryptographic protocols that guarantee session execution integrity.
It is easy to build a version of the typing rules of Table 11 without subtyping (Rule bSUBSc),
in which there is a one-to-one correspondence between process constructors and typing rules.
This syntax-directed type system would support a type inference algorithm of linear complexity
in the process structure. Security is clearly undecidable in general, since it requires checking
bisimulation. Safety is undecidable too, as computations may be infinite, but it should be more
tractable than security in a large number of cases, mainly thanks to compositionality.
We expect that a version of our monitored semantics, enriched with labelled transitions, could
turn useful to the programmer, either to help her localise and repair program insecurities, or
to deliberately program well-controlled security transgressions, according to some dynamically
determined condition. To illustrate this point, let us look back at our medical service example of
Figure 1 in Section 2. In some special circumstances, we could wish to allow the user to send
her hospital admission request in clear, for instance in case of an urgency, when the user cannot
afford to wait for data encryption and decryption. Here, if in the code of U we replaced the test
on critical(diagn>) by a test on no-urgency> and critical(diagn>), then in case of urgency we
would have a safety violation, which however should not be considered incorrect, given that it is
expected by the programmer. A labelled transition monitored semantics, with labels representing
security errors, would then allow the programmer to check that her code’s insecurities are exactly
the expected ones. This labelled semantics could also be used to control error propagation, thus
avoiding to block the execution of the whole process in case of non-critical or limited errors.
In this case, labels could be recorded in the history of the process and the execution would be
allowed to go on, postponing error analysis to natural breaking points (like the end of a session).
The work presented in this paper can be seen from two different perspectives. Our first goal
was to extend the analysis of information leak detection/prevention in multiparty sessions by
introducing safety, a notion which is more local and flexible than typability and security. To this
†† Each session channel is used “polymorphically” to send objects of different types and levels, since it is the only means
for a participant to communicate with the others in a given session.
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aim, we kept our model very simple: the execution of a process is blocked as soon as there is a
safety violation. In a more applied perspective, the present proposal could be seen as a first step
towards a more flexible model, better suited for implementation in real systems, where safety
violations could simply be signalled to the programmer and the execution be blocked only in
very dangerous cases. In this model, the security levels composing the lattice could be enriched
to incorporate information about the criticality of the violation, in order to drive different effects
on the execution (warnings, errors, blockings).
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